FCDO FOI2025/24643 – Digest of Information to be Released- Redacted Version

a. Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) Plan 2008-2011 for Director Approval April 2008- Engaging with the Diaspora

Obj. no	Programme/project activity	Cost by programme/project 2008	Duration	Programme total 08-11
	Engaging with the Diaspora - Berghoff	£63,605	1 Jul 08 - 30 Jun 10	£268,507
	Overall Cost for 3 Objectives	**£2,049,479**		**£3,764,437**

b. Diaspora Project Excel Sheet, Year 1, 2 and 3- Found in Shared Files

	Year 1														
Activity	DETAIL		April	May	June	July	August	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	March	**Total Cost (£)**
Action Research (Field study+ Meta level analysis)	Laptops for Field Research	2 x 935				£1,870									£1,870
	Project Coordinator	24 months x 1870				£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£1,870	£16,830
	Researcher	24 months x1400				£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£1,400	£12,600
	Research Assistant	12 months x1170				£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£1,170	£10,530
	Berghof Foundation Backstopping	15 months x2940										£2,940	£2,940	£2,940	£8,820
	International Travel for Field Research	10 trips *940						£940			£940				£1,880
Establishment and meetings of an Advisory Group	Honorarium for Advisory Group	4 meetings x1400							£1,400						£1,400
	Honorarium for support services (minutes taker, survey etc)	4 Meetings x 585							£585						£585
	CJPD Admin	24 months x 505				£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£4,545
	Berghof Foundation Admin	24 months x 505				£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£505	£4,545
	TOTAL					£7,320	£5,450	£6,390	£7,435	£5,450	£6,390	£8,390	£8,390	£8,390	£63,605

Activity	Detail	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total Cost
	Year 2:					
Action Research (Field study+ Meta level analysis)	Project Coordinator	£5,610	£5,610	£5,610	£5,610	£22,440
	Researcher	£4,200	£4,200	£4,200	£4,200	£16,800
	Research Assistant	£3,510				£3,510
	International Travel for Field Research (10 trips x	£1,880	£1,880	£1,880	£1,880	£7,520
	Berghof Foundation Backstopping	£8,820	£8,820	£8,820	£8,820	£35,280
Diaspora Dialogue Workshops Establishment and meetings of an Advisory Group	Diaspora Dialogue Series and preparation (4 meetings x 4680)		£18,720			£18,720
	Honorarium for Expert Consultation (2 experts x 1400)		£2,800			£2,800
	Honorarium for Advisory Group	£1,400		£1,400		£2,800
	Honorarium for support services	£585		£585		£1,170
	Sri Lanka Diaspora Mapping	£3,800	£3,800	£3,800	£3,800	£15,200
	International Travel for Diaspora Mapping (5 trips x 940)	£1,175	£1,175	£1,175	£1,175	£4,700
	CJPD Admin	£1,515	£1,515	£1,515	£1,515	£6,060
	Berghof Foundation Admin	£1,515	£1,515	£1,515	£1,515	£6,060
	TOTAL					**£143,060**

	Year 3:					
	Project Coordinator	£5,610				£5,610
	Berghof Foundation Backstopping	£8,820				£8,820
Comparative study of 'stateless'	International Conference	£23,500				£23,500
	Honorarium for Advisory Group	£1,400				£1,400
	Honorarium for support services	£585				£585
Publication & Dissemination	Layout and Printing	£4,672				£4,672
	Researcher	£4,200				£4,200
	Report Writer	£4,680				£4,680
	Postage and Report Dissemination costs	£2,345				£2,345
Evaluation	External Evaluation	£3,000				£3,000
	CJPD Admin	£1,515				£1,515
	Berghof Foundation Admin	£1,515				£1,515
	TOTAL					**£61,842**
				Grand total		**£268,507**

c. Diaspora Project- Interim Results (1.5 years) from 28 April 2008

In addition to technical preparation of the diaspora project, which foresees the establishment of an Advisory Board consisting of leading scholars and experts in Tamil diaspora studies, social anthropology and other relevant discipline and the review of already available research papers on Tamil diaspora, we envision to produce the following results at the end of 1 ½ UK financial year

1. In year one, a mapping of the Tamil diaspora community in UK *[redacted]* will be undertaken as a preparation for the field studies. A number of selected Tamil diaspora intellectuals and academics in the field of transnational migration and diaspora studies and anthropology will be invited to jointly conduct the mapping exercise. The same mapping exercise will be carried out to identify the transnational Sinhala community*[redacted]* The mapping of the Tamil diaspora and the Sinhala transnational community will be based on certain criteria such as number, relevance, political activism, political attitude etc. *[redacted]*

2. The results of the mapping exercise will flow into the subsequent field research based on a research agenda (to be formulated by the research team). The field research will specifically analyse the home-host land nexus, identity formation, political mobilization and identify potential sources of change agents in the diaspora to function as bridge-builders. The research findings will build the foundation for the proposed work shops. The research findings will also be shared with the donors.

3. At the end of year 1 ½ , we intend to carry out two-three international workshops on Tamil diaspora identity, Tamil diaspora political activism in the aftermath of 9/11 and Tamil/Sinhala exchange to explore common ground and work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka. The workshops (four workshops and an international conference are envisaged altogether) will build the bulk of the project and all the other activities (such as mapping and field studies etc) are just mere instruments to foster the discussions and build a solid intellectual framework. *[redacted]*

As mentioned in the proposal, the *[redacted]* will ensure a proper assessment and monitoring plan and will also submit reports on a semi-annual basis informing the donors on the progress of the project. Within the first month of the commencement of the project, a work plan will be forwarded to the donors for their information and perusal.

The advisory board as well as other influential circles in the diaspora will be accessible to the donors in case of any other pressing concerns or issues. *[redacted]* will be in a position to facilitate these meetings also at short notice.

Minutes of the GCPP Committee meeting held on Tuesday 16 October 2007

Present

[redacted]

2.Diaspora

2.1 *[redacted]* updated the committee on the CJPD Tamil diaspora initiative. *[redacted]*will be submitting a project document within the next 4 weeks. The second initiative, engagement with the business diaspora was discussed. The implementing partner is *[redacted]* who would promote a dialogue with the business community in UK. There was little interest for this proposal and the committee agreed it should not be taken forward.

d. Found in BHC Colombo Emails- Info on Projects – sets out various projects that were undertaken by BHC from 2008-2012, including on diaspora mapping and dialogues.

BIDDING FORM

SECTION A: PROJECT CONCEPT

A1: BASIC INFORMATION

** To be filled in by Embassy/High Commission staff*

Fund/ Programme *	
Programme objective *	
Post objective *	
Project Title	**Engaging Tamil Diaspora: Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace**
Countries Covered	Sri Lanka

Project Purpose *1 sentence: immediate or direct benefit/ development that the project will achieve. This is the rationale for doing the project.*	*To empower and strengthen the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora community to engage more actively to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict, to address internal differences and to explore ways and means to bring the Sinhala transnational[1] community together with the Tamil Diaspora for mutual understanding, joint analysis and activities for peace-building*

Outputs *The quantitative or qualitative deliverables or product of the project activities. These should be sufficient to deliver the project purpose*	1. ***Policy Papers and Diaspora Mapping*** for a better understanding of the complex 'homeland'-'hostland' dynamics with regard to political/civil-society activism of the Tamil Diaspora, i.e. a series of issue-centered policy papers (3-10), on how policies and contexts in 'homeland' and 'hostland' shape the mode and content of Tamil Diaspora politics (i.e. long-distance nationalism) and the mapping of the Tamil Diaspora and the Sinhala transnational community in UK in terms of political affiliation, political culture/mobilization, generational diversity etc. 2. ***Diaspora Dialogue Workshops and constructive engagement*** for a better understanding of the modes of political mobilization in main locations of the Tamil Diaspora and exploring the possibility for joint collaborative efforts within the Tamil Diaspora as well as with the Sinhala transnational community. Understanding better the transnational networks and the complex relationship between the key Tamil stakeholder - the LTTE - and the Tamil Diaspora. A series of dialogue workshops will be held in UK around thematic issues based on the policy papers (1). Four Diaspora dialogue workshops on (a) Tamil Diaspora political Identity (b) Tamil Diaspora political activism in the aftermath of 9/11 (c) Tamil Diaspora as Agents of peaceful change and (d) Tamil and Sinhala expatriates and negotiated peace. 3. **Learning lessons and sharing experiences from similar Diaspora formations in UK**. Learning from political Diaspora formations in the UK which have been more successful in raising political issues (e.g. Palestinians, Somali, Kurds, Eritrea) 4. **Diaspora Core Group** consisting of multipliers and agents of peaceful change. The key outcome of the project is the creation of a critical mass of Diaspora members who engage in sustained political discourses with a broad spectrum of other insiders and outsiders representing different opinions towards a peaceful solution in Sri Lanka.

	5. **Book Publication** and dissemination of the results of the combined deliberations arising from policy research, comparative analysis and dialogue completed in the course of the project.

Main Activities *(200 words max)* *Planned activities within the project. These should be sufficient to deliver the stated outputs*	*1. Preliminary meeting* Discussion of boundaries & overall scope of project, the division of labor among the project team. 2. *Establishment of an Advisory Group*[2] Consisting of leading experts, academics and practitioners in the fields of politics, Diaspora and social anthropology. This group will meet regularly to monitor progress and give feedback on commissioned policy papers. 3. *Action Research*[3] *(Field study + Meta level analysis and Diaspora Mapping*) In line with Action Research methodology, which goes beyond understanding of social systems but develops tools to assist the process of change, the project envisions a comprehensive field study in UK and in the second phase of the project also *[redacted]* *4. Diaspora-internal meetings and seminars* A key focus will be on enhancing Diaspora-internal exchanges and bringing together persons with different opinions within the Tamil community. These meetings will be very much issue-centered and will start with discussions on the conclusions from the policy papers. *5. Dialogue workshops also with representatives from the Sinhala transnational community* In the two-year project span, four such workshops will be conducted. They will also be issue-centered and will try to explore new ground by reflecting in their composition the variety of opinions within both communities. *5. International Workshop: a comparative study of successful Diaspora formations*

	A comparative investigation of successful Diaspora groups to draw some possible generic lessons and conclusions. *6. Establishment of a core group of Diaspora influentials* The main goal of the project is to identify a critical mass of Diaspora influentials who could work consistently towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka (strategy development, political lobbying, generation of creative options etc) and who represent a sufficiently broad spectrum of different opinions. *7. Publication and Dissemination* The findings of the project will be compiled in a book and made available to policy makers and advisors from the British Foreign Office, the Parliament, civil society groups, and the expert community at large. Additionally, innovative options for engaging with the Tamil Diaspora will be drawn up and submitted to the donor.

Background *(please use bullet points and use 300 words max)* *include relevant work conducted in this area and co-ordination that has taken place regarding this project*	» The Diaspora communities have, and continue to, influence the peace and conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka. As key opinion formers, they have always been a key stakeholder in the Sri Lankan conflict. With one in four Sri Lankan Tamils now living in the Diaspora, they have historically played an important role in the conflict. Amid a dearth of publications[4] on the role of the Tamil Diaspora, the main focus has been on remittances and its alleged role in 'financing' and 'fuelling' of conflict. » Less is known about the constructive potential of the 700,000[5] to 800,000[6] Tamil Diaspora, e.g. supporting rehabilitation and development measures in their homelands and serving as pressure blocs to co-shape policy decisions in their 'host' as well as 'home' countries. » Questions related to the political mobilization of the Tamil Diaspora, their political values, network structures, their role in opinion-making and the dialectic interplay between the conduct of the 'host' and 'home' countries and Diaspora identity formation have not been adequately addressed by existing studies. » With growing interest in the phenomena, ethnographic studies have focused on community formation and identity politics in Diaspora, however the majority of these resort to a static understanding of identity formation. This project seeks to reflect on the complex interplay between environment and identity formation and recognizes that diaspora identities are constructed, re-constructed, negotiated and re-defined by changing circumstances. » The activities of the Tamil Diaspora are primarily limited to political activism in a narrow sense (mass rallies, demonstrations etc) and seldom shaped by conscious strategic decisions. They are rather shaped by references to unjust treatments and a history of suffering. Except for some few events (e.g. ISGA deliberations), the Diaspora has not contributed sufficiently in terms of exploring constructive creative options for resolving the ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka and pursuing them strategically in the context of a realistic

	assessment of “doable” options. The project attempts to address this lacuna. » International foreign and development policies have failed to see the opportunity structures created by migration, for instance, the immense potential of the Tamil Diaspora to foster conflict transformation initiatives and to actively engage in development activities in their country of origin. Moreover, the engagement of officials with the Diaspora has been ad hoc and issue based (in the context of migration policies or internal security). While the need for a sustained engagement with the Diaspora is seen as most critical, the ways and means of this engagement has remained unclear to date. » The Sinhala transnational community also plays an important part in the overall ethnopolitical conflict even if they are not as influential as the Tamil Diaspora. But they comprise also a broad spectrum of different opinions and key persons within the Sinhala community abroad have become drivers of new responses to the conflict, with an escalatory as well as a moderating orientation.

Longer Term Impact	
Sustainability *How will the project ensure that these benefits are sustained*	» The Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD), which will be the co- implementing partner on this project, is a leading Tamil Diaspora think-tank mandated to mobilise Diaspora networks to bring about a negotiated resolution to the conflict[7]. The CJPD will ensure that the findings and recommendations of this project are disseminated through its networks in Diaspora and through similar Diaspora organisations across the world. To ensure maximum benefit, the CJPD will collaborate with other Diaspora entities in UK[8]. Moreover, the CJPD hopes to open a branch office in London in September through which it will coordinate and conduct its activities. » The project will target key opinion formers and potential interlocutors within the Sri Lankan Diaspora communities and it is hoped they will play the role of catalysts and multipliers in their respective communities to increase the likelihood for a negotiated settlement. *[redacted]* will ask the support of the *[redacted]*, a collective of diverse Sri Lankan expatriates, to ensure the participation of key Sinhala opinion formers in UK. » We envisage that the Diaspora dialogues held in major Diaspora centres *[redacted]* will foster greater communication and enhance trust amongst the Diaspora as well as with policy makers in host countries and Sinhala expatriates with an interest in resolving the conflict peacefully. Efforts will be made to continue these dialogues beyond the scope of the project once the initial contact is established.

A2: BUDGET INFORMATION

TOTAL COST TO FCO		**£ 334,187**
Please state how costs will be divided over UK Financial Years (April – March)	Year 1	38.770
	Year 2	143.000
	Year 3	152.417

Proposed Start Date	1 December 2008	Proposed end date	30 March 2011

Co-funding		
Type (e.g. in kind/ cash)	Organisation	Amount
In kind	*[redacted]*	We will bear the cost for backstopping for December 08.

Total Cost of Project		% of FCO funding	
334.187 Pounds		100	

Have you applied for funding for the same project idea to other donors? If not heard, when do you expect to hear? What was the outcome?
No

Do you wish to avoid publicity because this is a project of a confidential nature? *Y/N*	*N*

A3: CONTACT INFORMATION

Post (lead Post if regional)		*[redacted]*	
Contact at Post/ dept		*[redacted]*	
E-mail address		*[redacted]*	
Phone no	*[redacted]*	Fax No *[redacted]*	

Name of Co-Implementing Org													
FCO		OGD		UK NGO		Local NGO		Global NGO	X	Commercial company		Other	
Contact at Implementing Org						*[redacted]*Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD)							
E-mail Address: *[redacted]*						*[redacted]*							
Phone No		*[redacted]*				Fax No		---					

Name of Co-Implementing Org			
Contact		*[redacted]*	
Email address		*[redacted]*	
Phone No	*[redacted]*	Fax No*[redacted]*	

[redacted]

SECTION B: FULL BID

B1: Monitoring and Evaluation of Objectives

Project Purpose (as stated in A1, above)		
The proposed project aims to develop constructive ways of engaging the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora for peace and development issues in Sri Lanka.		
Indicators of success (*evidence that will indicate the purpose has been achieved)*	**Status before project/ baseline data**	**Source of information** *(where you obtain information on the indicator)*
Awareness among key influentials within the Tamil Diaspora is raised about the positive role they can play in bringing about a negotiated settlement to the conflict.	The Diaspora are increasingly feeling marginalised and ´securitized´.	» Discussions with Tamil Diaspora community leaders » Review of Tamil Diaspora media.
A significant number of the Diaspora members become key actors influencing the policies of the conflict stakeholders as agents of peaceful change.	The efforts of Diaspora actors to change the mind-set of the conflict actors (and other Diaspora actors) towards a resolution are uncoordinated and unfocussed.	» Monitoring of key circles and organisations
Policy makers in host countries have gained a better understanding of the role the Diaspora can play in bringing about a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka.	Sporadic efforts to engage with the Diaspora in some host countries are undertaken (particularly the UK), however, no sustained or structured program.	» Discussions with Tamil Diaspora community groups. » Discussions with UK officials from Foreign Ministry and Development Department.

Expected Outputs (as stated in A1, above)			
Outputs	**Indicators of Success** (*evidence that the outputs have been delivered)*	**Status before project/ baseline data**	**Source of Information**
1. Policy Papers and Diaspora Mapping examining political activism of the Diaspora	» A significant number of policy papers are generated based on the input of key Diaspora influentials drawn from multiple consultation sessions, expert panels and seminars » Diaspora Dialogue workshop examining the subject.	» Very few comprehensive studies. » Available studies mainly view the subject from a security studies perspective.	» Literature review, data gathering » M&E plan review of diaspora dialogues
2. Diaspora Dialogue Workshops and constructive engagement	» Four Diaspora Dialogue workshops in UK examining multiple facets of the subject, bringing together key Diaspora members from around the world, policy makers and featuring experts in the field » Bringing together key Sinhala influentials with key Tamil Diaspora	» Lack of issue-centred discussions among the Diaspora communities » Diaspora meetings held in an ad hoc manner and without a 'strategic' perspective. » Only a few joint collaborative efforts of the Tamil Diaspora and Sinhala expatriate community	» Literature review. » M&E plan review of Diaspora dialogues.

	members in various settings (informal gathering, seminars, expert group etc)		
3. Learning lessons from and sharing experiences of similar Diaspora formations in UK.	» An international workshop with some crucial Diaspora communities in UK who had a strategic focus and were able to conduct their political activities in a peaceful and effective way	» Such an endeavour has not been initiated thus far » No comparative perspective available to learn lessons	» Literature review. » M&E plan review of Diaspora dialogues.
4. Diaspora Core group consisting of multipliers and agents of peaceful change	» Creation of a sound collaborative of Diaspora influentials who could serve as multipliers	» Lack of consistent and constructive engagement of the Diaspora and Sinhala expatriate community to bring about a political change in Sri Lanka	» Literature review. » M&E Plan
5. Book Publication and dissemination of the acquired knowledge	» A set of evidence-based policy papers, seminar reports to contribute to the wider discourse on the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora activism and showing ways to embark on joint collaborative efforts.	» No comprehensive study based on field activities available thus far on UK	» M&E plan

M&E Plan

How will the project be monitored?
» An advisory group consisting of experts, academics and practitioners in the field of migration, Diaspora and social anthropology will meet regularly to monitor the progress and review the commissioned papers. » *[redacted]*will draw up a detailed monitoring and evaluation plan based on the systemic approach » Semiannual project progress reviews and quarterly status reports will be submitted to the donors.
When and by whom will the evaluation of the project take place? *(must be within 3 months of project completion)* A small group of external evaluators will be chosen in consent with the donors to evaluate the project in the first half of the project

Project Risk Analysis

Risk	Likelihood (H/M/L)	Impact (H/M/L)	Management
Diaspora communities refuse to partake in field study.	M	H	Partners with a Diaspora organisation or access to the Diaspora community to implement the project using their networks to gain access to the community.
	M	H	An advisory group consisting of leading experts, academics and

			practitioners in the field of migration, Diaspora and social anthropology, this advisory group will meet regularly to monitor the progress and give feed-back to the commissioned papers
Project becomes fragmented with research elements in various locations not sharing information and experiences.	H	H	CJPD will draw on their international network to bring together community actors and academics based in different host countries for discussions at Diaspora dialogues and international conference. *[redacted]* will further tap resources from*[redacted]* a Sri Lankan Diaspora network with access to key influentials in the Sinhala community.
Size of project overwhelms partner organisation's management capacity.	M	H	*[redacted]* will maintain close working relationship with CJPD by way of backstopping to ensure project is managed efficiently.

B2: ACTIVITY BASED BUDGET (FCO COSTS ONLY) – SEE ATTACHMENT AT APPENDIX 1

[redacted]

B4: INSTITUTIONS

Capacity of Implementing Organisations to implement project
[redacted] The Foundation started work in Sri Lanka in 2001 with the objective of enhancing the capacities for conflict transformation in the country. Guided by the understanding that the Sri Lankan Diaspora is an essential stakeholder in the conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka, *[redacted]* has conducted various programmes on and with the Sri Lankan Diaspora since the inception of *[redacted]*. The activities undertaken in this regard range from roadmap papers on all three Sri Lankan Diasporic and transnational communities to a multiplicity of Sri Lanka Roundtable meetings with expert public, dialogue study groups with key influentials in the Diaspora, exchange programmes for young Diaspora members and an international seminar. This proposed project is based on the experiences and lessons gathered from our earlier activities in this field. The *[redacted]*will oversee the whole project. *[redacted]* will seek the support and participation of the *[redacted]* to ensure a minimum participation of key Sinhala opinion formers in abroad. The **Centre for Just Peace and Democracy** was founded in 2004 to formalise pre-existing networks of activists and academics in the Tamil Diaspora and beyond who have worked to bring about a just peace in Sri Lanka. Since 2007, the*[redacted]* . The CJPD has secured programme funding from other international and Sri Lankan sources. Since 2004, CJPD has engaged more than one hundred academics, practitioners, activists and intellectuals in the Tamil Diaspora, expert public and the Sri Lankan civil society on topics related to the peace process in Sri Lanka. To date, the CJPD has collaborated*[redacted]* and some Sri Lankan *[redacted]* organisations to conduct seminars and workshops.
Level of participation of the beneficiary organisation(s) in the project planning process

Government support: It cannot be expected that the present government will proactively support the project. Notwithstanding, such projects are crucial for preparing the ground for a new peace process in Sri Lanka.

B5: CROSS CUTTING EFFECTS OF PROJECT (positive or negative)

How does the project take into account any cross-cutting effect on the areas listed below? Do any adjustments need to be made to ensure that it is relevant and accessible to all stakeholders? Do any adjustments need to be made to ensure that there are no detrimental effects on these areas? What positive benefits in these areas might result from the project?

	Expected Effects/ consequences
Human Rights	Successful completion of the project will enhance efforts to ameliorate antagonism and build trust between Sri Lankan Diaspora communities and by induction, contribute towards better ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and thereby the general human rights situation there.
Diversity (inc gender and disability)	The field study will involve the deconstruction of the term Diaspora into gender, class/caste, stages of migration, political culture, generations etc and thus reflect the many faces and forms of Diaspora. This will give a better insight into the processes of identity formation and the relationship between ‘home’ and ‘host’ land.
Environment	n/a
Other	

B6: PUBLICITY

Media activity/ expected public diplomacy effects/ project promotion activities (including any sensitivities)
The project (both overall concept and individual research elements) can be expected to receive significant attention and scrutiny – both positive and, to a lesser extent, negative – from Diaspora media (inevitably) and in Sri Lanka. A public diplomacy (publicity, PR?) strategy will be drawn up in the planning stage to pro-actively position the project (thereby paving the way for the field research) and to build response mechanisms for any contingencies that may arise. Responsibilities for and content guidelines for press releases and publication at project and country levels will be agreed early. Publicity material will be issued in all necessary languages (Tamil, English, Sinhala and necessary 'hostland' language). CJPD staff will be available to engage with electronic media in relevant languages.

B7: ADDITIONAL DETAILS (if required)

[1] While in the scholarly discourse some tend to use a fairly broad definition of Diaspora as "processes of multi-locationality across geographical, cultural and psychic boundaries (Brah), others like Cheran insist on distinction between Diasporas and other migrants. The term Diaspora therefore is connected with a "sense of displacement and forced migration" (Cheran 2003), Cheran further argues "victimization and compulsion are two important aspects that characterize iasporas that are complex social, historical and cultural communities. (..) Not all dispersals result in the formation of Diasporas." (2007:154). This proposal uses a more neutral term of "transnational community" for Sinhala expatriates.

[2] *[redacted]*

[3] *[redacted]*, a social psychologist first coined this term to describe "work that didn't separate the investigation from the action needed to solve the problem". This methodology involves a non-linear pattern of planning, acting, observing and reflecting on the changes in social systems.

[4] *[redacted]*

[5] *[redacted]*

[6] *[redacted]*

[7] The resource pool and the advisory board of the CJPD consists of *[redacted]*

[8] *[redacted]*

e. Email from *[redacted]* sharing the SL_Disapora_Project_Report - outlining results for project FCDO/DFID funded.

From: *[redacted]*

Sent: 28 June 2011 00:53

To: *[redacted]*

Subject: Project Report: Engaging Tamil Diaspora for Peace and Development (2009-2011)

Dear friends and colleagues,

We are pleased to announce that the internal evaluation report of the project "Engaging Tamil Diaspora for Peace and Development" *[redacted]*

Between January 2009 and March 2011, *[redacted]* and the Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD) undertook a two-year project with the Tamil Diaspora in the UK, with the aim of empowering the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the UK to contribute to sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. The purpose of this report is to publicize the main findings and insights of the project and to share the challenges, dilemmas, and lessons learnt of the project with a wider audience of diaspora activists, academics and peacebuilding practitioners.

If you are interested in further reading about the project, please also see the policy and research papers by diaspora activists and researchers that were produced in the context of several project activities over the past two years. The papers are accessible online at the*[redacted]* website.

Please note that the authors are responsible for the content of the papers, they do not reflect the views of *[redacted]* and CJPD.

Please don't hesitate to let us hear your feedback!

Kind regards

[redacted]

In public Domain- Engaging Tamil Diaspora for Peace and Development (2009-2011)

f. GCPP Finance Matrix from January 2008

GCPP - PROJECT MATRIX 2007 / 2008 AND 2008 / 2009

OBJECTIVE AREA/S	PROJECT TITLE & IMPLEMENTING PARTNER	Lead PMT/ (Advisor)	Total Allocation from April 07	Committed for 2007 / 2008 (allocation as per grant agreement)	Actual spend of resources	Partners' projected remaining spend till 31 Mar	Project lead's assessment on likely remaining spend	Most likely spend for remainder + Actual spend (Total spend for FY)	Potential spend for 2008 / 2009 (already approved in green)	Project start date	Project end date

[redacted]

			(for two FYs)									
PROJECTS PENDING COMMITTEE APPROVAL												
I	Diaspora - Berghoff	[redacted]	75,000	15,000	0	0	0	0	0	tbc	tbc	
			(for two FYs)									

[redacted]

	Total		5,314,497	2,095,008	1,010,885	1,017,193	976,458	1,987,343	1,737,089		
					50.54%	50.86%	48.82%	99%	87%		
	Total Value of projects already approved (A)		102.00%	2,039,906					1,442,089		
	Total Value of imminent projects (B)		0.51%	10,102					295,000		
	Total Value of projects in the pipeline (C)		2.50%	50,000					0		
	Tot. Val. of apprvd. and imminent projects		102.50%	2,050,008							
	Total Value of planned projects		105.00%	2,100,008					1,737,089	Updated:	29-Jan-08

g. CPP Portfolio May 2008

OFFICIAL

GCPP - PROJECT MATRIX 2007 / 2008 AND 2008 / 2009

	PROJECT TITLE & IMPLEMENTING PARTNER	Lead PMT/ (Advisor)	Total Allocation from April 07	Committed for 2008 / 2009 (allocation as per grant agreement)	Partners' projected spend till 31-Mar-09	Actual spend		Project start date	Project end date

[redacted]

			(for two FYs)						
PROJECTS PENDING COMMITTEE APPROVAL/NEXT YEAR SPEND									
I	Diaspora - Berghoff	Nilakshan / (John)	75,000	75,000	0	0		tbc	tbc
			(for two FYs)						

Engaging Sri Lanka's Transnational and Diaspora Communities in Dialogue for Peace

January 2009 – March 2011

[redacted]

(April 2011)

Background

1.1 *[redacted]* was created because the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) of the UK Government did not want to fund two separate Sri Lanka diaspora projects due to logistical, administrative and management capacity limitations.

1.2 Because of the experience of both organisations in Sri Lanka, and within the prevailing turbulent political context, neither organisation wanted to be funded by the other, or to be seen working closely together.

1.3 To enable both organisations to submit project proposals and for this

(a) to be administered for BHC purposes through one channel,

(b) to keep both organisations at a distance,

(c) to minimise the risks to each organisation

the *[redacted]* was formed (Appendix 3: ToRs; Appendix 4: MoU)

1.4 The [redacted] was designed to allow each organisation to implement its project 1 with a large degree of independence, but within a general programmatic framework and structure which allowed synergy between the initiatives.

1.5 The [redacted] would also provide a coordination mechanism for promoting and facilitating Diaspora and transnational community programmes and initiatives focused on peaceful change. As well as working with [redacted] held discussions with community cohesion practitioners from [redacted] And [redacted] in relation to the community cohesion agenda.

1.6 The [redacted] was to be based in London at [redacted] would link with other institutions and networks that complemented [redacted] activities, and would share lessons learned, information, resources and strategic knowledge on diaspora activities.

1.7 Funding for the [redacted] did not come from 'extra money' but from within the proposed [redacted] budget.

2. Objectives of Evaluation

2.1 With reference to the ToRs, the purpose of the [redacted] evaluation is to review and assess the [redacted] with respect to its outputs and activities related to:

2.1.1 Facilitated discussions between initiatives focused on diaspora and peacebuilding.

2.1.2 Reflect on lessons learned from a variety of diaspora initiatives.

2.1.3 Broaden and deepen diaspora and peacebuilding knowledge by commissioning complementary research and exchange programs.

2.1.4 Provide a mechanism for independent programmes to access a network of research and practice which will help strengthen the diaspora and peacebuilding field of work.

2.1.5 To incorporate the cross-cutting themes with respect to outputs and impact of the project and its activities of: relevance; coherence (and complementarity to other initiatives); effectiveness; efficiency; sustainability; participation (of other donors, partners and beneficiaries in planning and implementation); and lessons learnt.

2.2 The evaluation will also make reference to the strategic recommendations made in the February 2010 *[redacted]* Review. These advised the *[redacted]* to expand its Steering Committee, explore fundraising opportunities in regard to other key Diaspora communities in the UK, generate new knowledge on strategic approaches of working with diaspora for peace for policy advice, explore options for the two projects to undertake joint activities, and explore formats for the *[redacted]* to provide the British government with more analytical and synthesized information.

3. Evaluation Methodology

3.1 The evaluation has been carried out by two external evaluators, contracted to evaluate the *[redacted]* and the *[redacted]* projects respectively, who collected information separately and then co-authored the report. The fact that at the start of the evaluation there was no connection between the two evaluators may provide an illustration of the challenges of organisational and administrative communication between *[redacted]*.

3.2 The methodology of the evaluation was: a desk review of *[redacted]* documentation and reports; interviews with *[redacted]* staff; interviews with *[redacted]* co-ordinator; and interviews with the donor. The evaluation was also informed by interviews carried out with a wider selection of persons involved in the *[redacted]* in connection with the evaluation of these two projects.

3.3 The interviews dealt with the origins of the *[redacted]*, its main purpose and activities, achievements of the *[redacted]*main challenges and difficulties faced by *[redacted]*and visions for the future, while also discussing the broader context of diaspora engagement for peacebuilding in Sri Lanka.

4. Evaluation Findings

4.1 Developments in Sri Lanka, after the January 2009 formation of the *[redacted]*, within the context of the escalation of the war fighting and the subsequent military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, meant that the *[redacted]* needed to re-assess:

(a) the objectives and scope of potential collaboration between the *[redacted]* projects, and;

(b) the degree of meaningful and realistic communication now possible between the Sinhalese and Tamils in the diaspora. For example politically active Tamils were reluctant to meet with Sinhalese unless they saw concrete moves from the GoSL related to securing a just peace and more opportunities for access to political power and Sinhalese saw no point in talking with people they still viewed as having LTTE terrorist links (and it was a victor's peace).

4.2 Whilst the formation of the *[redacted]* was administratively advantageous to the *[redacted*, the evaluators were not clear about its actual cost benefit for either the *[redacted]*. Much energy was put into agreeing and working through the functioning of the *[redacted]* and its *[redacted]* . There were in-built issues from the start given the early reluctance of the two organisations to work together. It seems that this really was a 'marriage of convenience' insisted on by the donors rather than originating from a well thought through collaborative provision from *[redacted]*.

4.2.1 During the first half of the project, the Steering Committee came together regularly, and held discussions which were seen as fruitful learning exercises by the committee members. Much time was spent on agreeing on the functioning of the *[redacted]*, including principles for communication. However, during the second half of the project period, getting the geographically spread out steering group together seems to have become increasingly difficult for a number of reasons. Not only were *[redacted]* staff members very busy but since the meetings were held in London, the *[redacted]* members felt that they had to put in time they were not paid for to travel to meetings. The *[redacted]* coordinator also had problems in getting input and feedback for *[redacted]* proposals and activities. So although the *[redacted]* review of February 2010 suggested an expansion of the Steering Committee, instead the Committee seems to have lost its vigor, and was never expanded.

4.2.2 *[redacted]* expressed the view that there was a tension having a part-time *[redacted]* coordinator who was (a) an employee of *[redacted]* and (b) located at the *[redacted]* London office. This raised the question of whether, even with the best intention, a coordinator put in such a position could equally represent both *[redacted]*

It is clear, that given these perceptions, if the *[redacted]* is to be continued revised policy and procedures for the recruitment and management of *[redacted]*

staff, and the location of the *[redacted]* office, would need to be renegotiated by *[redacted]*.

4.3 Expectations of the *[redacted]* other than a channel for funding, were probably too high. In spite of the good work and commitment of the coordinator, a mere 50 per cent of full time, hardly any funding for activities and few prior connections with diaspora peacebuilding initiatives and research in the UK, made it unrealistic to reach the goals set up and to make *[redacted]* a meaningful mechanism for discussions and reflections on diasporas and peacebuilding. Although attempts were made to raise other funds to expand the scope of *[redacted]*, these were not successful.

4.4 Given this backdrop, a number of achievements of the *[redacted]* can be identified.

4.4.1 The *[redacted]* has provided a forum for a structured dialogue between the *[redacted]* involved in the diaspora projects, which enabled an intellectual learning process for those involved, particularly the steering group which consisted of four persons.

However, these learning processes do not seem to have served to re-shape the two projects in any substantial way. Moreover, there did not seem to be any evidence that this internal dialogue led to an enhanced Tamil-Sinhalese shared understanding improving peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. To be fair to the *[redacted]* teams, and as has been previously noted, there was considerable resistance from both communities to the idea of collaborating or even meeting each other.

The existence of the *[redacted]* as a funding mechanism did contribute to the smooth functioning of the two projects in a volatile environment. None of the projects came under attack during the project period, in spite of their sensitive nature and the sometimes harsh accusations in Sri Lanka against NGOs and diaspora activism. Although this may not be because of the existence of the *[redacted]* funding mechanism, several interviewees perceived the *[redacted]* as helpful in protecting *[redacted]* against attacks. To have the *[redacted]* as a “neutral” name and organization when organizing diaspora events was also seen as beneficial.

4.4.2 A main activity of the *[redacted]*

was the organization of a one day workshop, Challenges and Opportunities in Rehabilitation and Development and the Role of the Diaspora which bought together academic researchers, NGO representatives and persons from both Tamil and Sinhalese diaspora. The workshop has been fully reported - see the *[redacted]* Progress Reports and Workshop Report (September 2010). The objective of the workshop was not explicitly so much about dialogue (this

was too sensitive and difficult to explain) but rather about learning from examples and experience from elsewhere. Using outside experts helped create the context for discussion.

(a) Reported feedback from the workshop participants seems to be positive in that the workshop provided a dialogue space. The *[redacted]* organizers need to be applauded for actually managing to hold the event, in what was an extremely sensitive context, and for creating a meeting space between academics and diaspora activists. However, although the participants indicated that they had an interest in continued contacts, as the workshop report notes there have been no follow-up events planned and no concrete outcome to the event. The evaluators did not hear anything about the continuation of any 'new relationships' that were formed.

Because of the sensitivity encountered attendance could not be extended to a wider diaspora engagement which reflected the more extreme views, such as the ultra-nationalists. It could be argued that it is too early to expect this, and further funding and commitment from *[redacted]* could build on the workshop.

But, given the energy and time committed to organising this workshop it is difficult to identify any real impact within the context of the overall project purpose. However, the process which led up to the workshop, and the contacts made, is likely to be of use for further *[redacted]* work with diasporas and peace-building.

(b) Some interviewees expressed the feeling that an underlying motivation to hold the workshop was to establish the *[redacted]* in its own right and demonstrate that it "was doing something". But it was a move in the right direction.

(c) In connection to the workshop, *[redacted]* commissioned a number of research papers that were good resource material for the workshop. Because of the sensitivity attached to some of the issues these have not yet been more widely circulated. Although this research seems to have been of good quality, the limited dissemination makes the wider impact of it rather limited.

4.5 The objective of the *[redacted]* to be a "coordinating mechanism in the UK for diaspora and peacebuilding initiatives and research" was ambitious especially given the limited capacity of the *[redacted]* which only has a part-time coordinator and a small (but developing) network and connections with research establishments and diaspora organisations. The *[redacted]* has participated at the *[redacted]* attended an NGO roundtable on Sri Lanka at DFID, and included advisors at the *[redacted]* steering committee meetings to help deepen perspectives and planning. More interaction with diaspora organizations and researchers cannot be expected, given the limited resources and time available. However, to fulfill the ambition to be a

coordination mechanism for diaspora and peacebuilding initiatives in a meaningful way, increased resources would need to be allocated. Establishing such a mechanism would necessitate a systematic inventory of diaspora peacebuilding initiatives in the UK and other coordinating mechanisms and meeting points for such initiatives, and contacts and in-depth discussions with diaspora organizations and activists to find out their needs and priorities.

4.5.1 In developing its research co-ordination role, the *[redacted]* seems to be taking an interest in a wide spectrum of research on diaspora roles in development and peacebuilding in their home countries. With such an extensive area of interest the *[redacted]* needs to link up and network closely with other researchers and research institutes. This has so far been possible only to a very limited extent, given the limited resources available.

5. Conclusions and the Future

5.1 Having been established as a structure and mechanism through which CPP funding could be delivered to *[redacted]* is looking at its future role.

5.2 Since the *[redacted]* now wants to expand its mandate with, for example, a greater co-ordinating and research role in wider diaspora related activities there would

(a) need to be a thorough mapping of existing structures and mechanisms, and;

(b) a systematic investigation of what activities are needs driven by the diaspora community.

A discussion needs to be held about whether it is realistic for the *[redacted]* to take on such an ambitious role, or whether it would instead be advisable to concentrate its efforts on a more limited aspect of diasporas and peacebuilding. Examples of such more focused areas could be: diaspora youth and peacebuilding, or diaspora business and post-war reconstruction, building on experiences and contacts from the *[redacted]* projects.

Moreover, it is important that the role of the *[redacted]* as a coordinating mechanism for diaspora peacebuilding initiatives is driven by needs for such a mechanism from the intended beneficiaries (e.g. diaspora organizations, activists and researchers), rather than by a perceived need by the *[redacted]* to expand the *[redacted]* to justify its existence and protect their Sri Lanka focused projects.

5.3 The evaluators' comments are of course dependent on funding, and the demands made by the donor. Several options are possible:

(a) The FCO-CPP continues to fund both *[redacted]* and wants to retain the *[redacted]* as the funding mechanism.

(b) The FCO-CPP funds either *[redacted]*

(c) The *[redacted]* future funding (irrespective of *[redacted]* and FCO-CPP) as a programme within *[redacted]*. It could then develop further as a co-ordination umbrella and engage more systemically in diaspora work (in the UK and internationally) linked with other partners and networks.

(d) The *[redacted]* is folded into *[redacted]* future funding (irrespective of *[redacted]* and FCO-CPP) as a programme within *[redacted]*. It could then develop further as a co-ordination umbrella and engage more systemically in diaspora work (in the UK and internationally) linked with other partners and networks

In scenario (a), it is important that the donor makes an assessment of the cost effectiveness of the *[redacted]* as a funding mechanism. It is the view of the evaluators that the *[redacted]* as mainly a funding mechanism may have been useful given the sensitive context of the two projects and the administrative needs of the donors, but that this is not a good enough reason to retain this rather costly extra layer of administration. A *[redacted]* which, apart from being a funding structure, also takes on a greater role as a coordinator and learning mechanism of diaspora peacebuilding initiatives more broadly would be valuable, given the increased interest in diaspora and peacebuilding and the many and scattered such initiatives that exist in the UK. But this is so only if enough resources can be provided to realize the *[redacted]* ambitions to play such a coordinating role, either in relation to the theme of diasporas and peacebuilding more generally, or focusing on a particular aspect of this theme.

Appendix 1: Interviews

[redacted]

Appendix 2: Documentation

Workshop Report: *[redacted]* Challenges and Opportunities in Rehabilitation and Development and the Role of the Diaspora. Workshop held 23rd September 2010.

*[redacted]*Review – February 2010.

Diaspora Brief. Monthly focus on Tamil Diaspora events and activities.

Added value of establishing a "*[redacted]* for the two Sri Lanka Diaspora projects of *[redacted]*

[undated]

Progress Reports. PSA CPP SRL 000009 Engaging Sri Lanka's Transnational and Diaspora Communities in Dialogue for Peace. 1 January 2009-31st March 2009; April 2009-September 2009; October 2009-March 2010; April 2010-September 2010;

Terms of Reference: Steering Committee for Clearinghouse on Diaspora Engagement. 17th February 2009

Appendix 3:

Terms of Reference: Steering Committee for Clearinghouse on Diaspora Engagement (17 February 2009)

The Steering Committee will initially comprise of 2 members of each founding organisation of the *[redacted]* engagement. The steering committee can expand over time depending on the expansion of the *[redacted]* base and invited members should the necessity arise. For this, the initial phase of

the *[redacted]* the following key areas of activity will be the tasks and responsibilities of its members:

1. Supervision and advisory functions of the *[redacted]*

a. Review of the *[redacted]* and providing recommendations for future adaptations

b. Plan, supervise and periodically review the projects supported by the *[redacted]*

c. Review and approve year-end progress report and budget details prepared by the *[redacted]*

2. Crisis Prevention and Management

a. Review problems, backlash, negative publicity or attacks against projects supported by the *[redacted]* and provide troubleshooting guidance

b. Develop strategies and systems within the*[redacted]* to be prepared for and respond to potential negative attacks

c. Should issues arise, take on the responsibility of deciding on the best approach to resolve such crises

3. Develop synergies between projects supported by the *[redacted]*

a. Based on updates of the project supported by the *[redacted]*

b. Explore possible points of connection between the projects for joint activities

c. Discuss and provide recommendations/feedback on process changes that can be incorporated into the projects

4. Looking beyond existing projects towards a more broader clearinghouse on Diaspora engagement

a. Exploring possible new partners that work on diaspora engagement (Sri Lankan and well as non-Sri Lankan) including academic initiatives and inviting them to join the *[redacted]*

b. Identifying possible entry points in diaspora engagement work and further conceptual developments, including proposal development, and partnership linkages to fulfil these areas of potential

5. Developing fundraising strategies

a. Exploring fundraising opportunities for diaspora engagement based on conceptual ideas or gaps or partners' interests

b. Sharing information on opportunities with the partners

c. Providing guidance and approving project proposals as fitting within the objectives of the *[redacted]*

6. Policy advice to donors and funding governments

a. Build up a reserve of knowledge and information on diaspora engagement work and strategies

b. Provide policy advice and support to key donors or supporting governments on diaspora engagement when required to do so

c. Develop briefing notes if required on diaspora issues or engagement strategies

7. Develop a communication strategy for internal and external information sharing

a. Develop a clear understanding and strategy for communicating information on *[redacted]* projects and supported projects

b. Provide guidelines to donors and external partners on communicating information on *[redacted]* projects and supported projects

Appendix 4 MoU between *[redacted]*

[redacted]

j. Info note on the Support of Diaspora and Peacebuilding Initiatives by the CPP-FCO

The *[redacted]* was set up in London in 2009 with funds provided by the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) of the UK government. The *[redacted]* is a coordination mechanism for promoting and facilitating Diaspora and transnational community programmes and initiatives focused on peaceful change. The **Vision** of the*[redacted]* is to see societies in which Diaspora and transnational communities play a significant and pro-active role as drivers of peaceful change.

Programmes and projects linked to the *[redacted]* mechanism meet on a regular basis to critically reflect on their work, to gain insight from featured expert resource persons invited by the *[redacted]*, and to connect to a network beyond their specific country focus. The *[redacted]* is in its conception stage and is currently liaising with two independent programmes focussed on engaging the Sri Lankan Diaspora and transnational community. Below is a brief outline of the*[redacted]* 's current programme initiatives.

Engaging Tamil Diaspora; Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace: This programme will utilise state of the art applied research on identity formation and political mobilisation of Diasporas to explore new ground with respect to the transformative potential of one of the most vocal Diasporas in the world; the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora. The outcomes of this programme will be a set of policy papers to better understand the complex homeland/hostland dynamics; a series of Diaspora workshops to better understand the modes of political mobilisation; the creation of a Diaspora core group to act as multipliers and agents of peaceful change and finally to publish key results of the programme which will further the understanding of Tamil Diaspora and peacebuilding interventions.

Engaging transnational Sri Lankan business people: dialogue and action for sustaining peace and inclusive development: This programme is a dialogue and networking programme which will engage business leaders from across the Sri Lankan transnational community to constructively address the systemic socio-economic causes of the conflict in Sri Lanka. The outcomes of this programme are to create a new discourse in the Sri Lankan transnational community which goes beyond the ethno-political dimensions of the conflict; to encourage alternative voices within the Sinhala transnational community by providing the space for issue-based debates; reframe issues of regional development in the context of business and investment and finally, to develop a policy framework that can be used as a guideline of how best to engage Diaspora groups in issues of sustainable peace and development.

For further information please contact: FCO contact _____

k. Email from *[redacted]* to FCO April 2011.

Dear *[redacted]*

Please find attached the modified concept note, completed bidding form, activity plan and the budget overview. Thank you very much for your detailed feed-back. It was very helpful for us putting together this proposal and I hope that focusing the planned work this way matches well your strategic interests and addresses the questions you have raised.

As you will notice, we have not incorporated the objective of "Dealing with the Past and Accountability" as it would be difficult to show a clear outcome/impact at the end of this funding phase. However, we feel that this objective is in a medium term perspective a crucial one for the strategic orientation of the diaspora movements. We are convinced that coming to terms with their own at least implicit complicity with the gross human rights violations of the LTTE will be an important topic to give credibility to their demands for accountability vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan government, but this will indeed require a more sustained engagement. We have therefore added this objective in the annex for your perusal and would like to indicate that it should become part of the medium-term strategy in the follow-up funding phase 2012 and beyond.

Let me also make a general remark. We have avoided the terms "moderates" and "hardliners" in our concept note and in the bidding from as these terms would be seen as highly problematic terms by the Tamil Diaspora activists and this in turn will hamper our access and engagement with them and complicate matters. As mentioned in the concept note and the bidding form, it is important to get diaspora´s buy-in for this change process, otherwise this might not be sustainable and could provoke resistances. As with all our activities, we involve the stakeholders in all stages of the project (from drafting the proposal to the evaluation and reflection) to make the efforts sustainable and create ownership. This said, we do want to emphasize that the main two objectives of the project correspond with the BHC´s objectives of narrowing the gaps between the diaspora and the situation in Sri Lanka and discouraging hardliner approaches. Concerning BHC´s first objective of "boosting and encouraging moderate voices", we see our activities as a complementary effort to the *[redacted]* project which focuses precisely on this aspect.

We are in the process of finalizing the completion report and will send it to you shortly.

With respect to the visibility of the project we would appreciate if you could inform us in due time about your principles and strategies of communication.

My colleague *[redacted]* will be on vacation from tomorrow till May 13th. I would therefore appreciate if you could direct any emails during this period also *[redacted]*

With best regards

[redacted]

I. Project Completion Report*[redacted]*

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Add a classification if required.

Project Completion Report

To be completed by the implementing organisation within three months of the end of project.
All sections should be completed, and returned to the Project Officer in the Post.
The final project payment cannot be made until the Project Completion Report has been submitted to the Post.

1. Basic Information

Foreign Policy Priority*	Safeguard Britain´s national security
Fund/Programme	Conflict Prevention Pool

Programme Indicator		PSA CCP SRL 000009	
Country Business Plan Objective			
Project Title		Engaging Tamil Diaspora: Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace	
Countries covered		Sri Lanka and UK	
Name of Implementer			
Planned start Date	1 January 2009	Actual start date	1January 2009
Planned end Date	31st March 2011	Actual end date	31st March 2011
Please explain any variance in planned start and end dates			

*

1. **Safeguard Britain's national security** by countering terrorism and weapons proliferation, and working to reduce conflict.
2. **Build Britain's prosperity** by increasing exports and investment, opening markets, ensuring access to resources, and promoting sustainable global growth.
3. **Support British nationals** around the world through modern and efficient consular services.

- Strengthening the rules based international system in support of our values

2. Project Design

Project Purpose (from the original Project Bidding Form) (1 sentence **only**, describing the anticipated change. The direct benefit the project will achieve resulting from the activities and outputs. The reason for doing the project)

To empower and strengthen the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora to engage more actively to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict, to address internal differences and to explore ways and means to bring the Sinhala transnational community together with the Tamil Diaspora for mutual understanding, joint analysis and activities for peace-building

Were any significant changes to project design agreed with Post? (outputs, activities,

budgets, duration etc.,) Please describe these changes.

There were no significant changes to project design in that the promised deliverables were delivered. However, dates of planned activities were modified to suit circumstances in both Sri Lanka and the UK. Due to the currency devaluation, certain activities had to be down-sized. The pilot phase began at a time when the LTTE was a considerable military force on the island; at that stage it was relatively easy to identify the key figures in the Tamil diaspora. With the demise of the LTTE, the political landscape changed drastically and, with that, new actors (often replacing the old community leaders), new discourses and new types of activism emerged. Although the project had to adapt to these changing circumstances, it also offered new possibilities and contributed to a widening of democratic spaces. The adaptation process was not without challenges and, during the run-up to each workshop, we were confronted with the question of who was relevant at that point in time. Since this proved a somewhat tedious process, we started to use different criteria to select the participants for each of the workshops. The selection process moved away from targeting individuals to targeting individuals representing a particular stance or strand of thinking. The drastic overturn of events on the ground compelled the project team to revisit the initial project goals and to assess whether or not they remained valid. After an extensive process of re-strategising, with the support of the Advisory Group members, it was agreed that we should adapt an open and flexible strategy and place more emphasis on the process than the long-term outcome. Believing that the basic objective of the project – to empower and strengthen the Tamil diaspora – was still valid, the project team and Advisory Group agreed that it needed intelligent contextualisation to refocus on what was possible within the scope of the project. As a result, the project focus shifted slightly to engage with the (emerging) diversity within the Tamil diaspora in the UK, while at the same time continuing to build the capacity of the project's participants towards contributing to a sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

3. Achievement of Project Purpose

Purpose level indicators ***(from original proposal)***	Status before the project started ***(from original proposal)***	Outcome achieved at the end of the project	Source of information (where you obtain the information or evidence)

1. Awareness among key players influentials within the Tamil diaspora is raised about the positive role they can play in bringing about a negotiated settlement to the conflict.	The Diaspora are increasingly feeling marginalized and "securitized"	See separate sheet	See separate sheet
2. A significant number of the diaspora members become key actors, influencing the policies of the conflict stakeholders as agents of peaceful change	The efforts of Diaspora actors to change the mind-set of the conflict actors (and the other Diaspora actors) towards a resolution are uncoordinated and unfocussed.	See separate sheet	See separate sheet
3. Policy makers in host countries have gained a better understanding of the role the diaspora can play in bringing about a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka.	Sporadic efforts to engage with the diaspora in some host countries are undertaken, however, no sustained or structured programme.	See separate sheet	See separate sheet

2.			
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7.			
8.			

Has the purpose been achieved? If not, give reasons. Please state the sources of evidence

The purpose has been achieved despite the changed political framework conditions in Sri Lanka. As stated above, the project had to adjust its strategy slightly but we could accomplish all the planned activities. We received positive feed-back from the stakeholders who were involved in the project (see the feed-back forms that were sent after every activity). At the end of this project, we can observe a more empowered and active diaspora. Certainly, not only as the result of our efforts but we were able to provide a platform for those who were interested to reflect on their activities and exchange their ideas, concerns, critical feed-back with peers. The sub objective of bringing the Tamil community with the Sinhala community was not achieved to our satisfaction. Although the activity took place, it was a very difficult and a fragile process. While there was willingness among a significant section of the Tamil diaspora activists to participate in the workshop, a strong view among many diaspora Tamils prevails that Sinhalese-Tamil dialogue is not fruitful as long as power relations remain extremely unbalanced, as has been the case in the wake of the Sri Lankan government's victory and the upsurge of Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka (and in the diaspora). Dialogue under the conditions of "Sinhalese" victory would only serve the interests of the Sinhalese, and risk giving the impression of "inter-ethnic harmony" while ignoring Tamil grievances and rights. Many diaspora Tamils argued that the timing was not right for initiating Tamil-Sinhalese dialogue.

Have any external factors contributed to the achievement of the project purpose? Please describe.

Although the violent escalation of the war in January 2009 did pose a challenge to the project, in a paradoxical way, it also contributed to the empowerment of a significant section of the Tamil Diaspora activists. This, in turn, was a good starting point for our project as the Tamil Diaspora was keener to be involved in dialogue activities than in the past.

Please describe any **unplanned** outcomes?
Outcome achieved at the end of the project

First indicator: In all our workshops, research papers, focus group meetings, and even the input of various resource people from Sri Lanka and elsewhere, the main topic has remained: “how the Tamil diaspora could play a pro-active, positive role in contributing towards sustainable peace in Sri Lanka”. The roadmap paper “Empowering Diasporas” explicitly engages with this question, discusses a number of issues, and offers the diaspora a set of recommendations. The paper was discussed in various forums (diaspora circles, international meetings with members of the donor community). However, the perception of being “marginalized” and “securitized”, unfortunately, continues to prevail in the diaspora. Although the increased activism occurred independently from the project (as a result of external circumstances and the situation on the ground), the project was not only able to provide a space for those who were interested in broadening their knowledge of multiple peaceful options to pursue their struggle for justice and peace and to discuss various strategies from other international cases, but also to take inspiration from civil society actors in Sri Lanka about what their perception of the diaspora is and what, in their view, the diaspora should be doing to remain credible and effective. This indicator was achieved successfully. **Source of information:** Feedback given at workshops, discussions with participants and community leaders, the roadmap paper was discussed in various internet platforms, the resource people invited for the workshop from Sri Lanka referred positively to the engagement with the diaspora
Second indicator: The Diaspora actors have a targeted range of actors whom they engage in order to bring about a just solution. Their engagements are also more specific, seeking achievable targets. However, the second indicator was only partly achieved due to the changing framework conditions on the ground. The original intention was to expand the political section of the diaspora that sought to contribute towards a sustainable negotiated settlement to the conflict by actively devising alternative political ideas to further the trajectory of negotiations between LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka. With the demise of the LTTE in May 2009, this indicator was no longer relevant.

Third indicator: The project used all available avenues to offer a nuanced understanding of the Tamil diaspora and to encourage policy makers to make use of this substantial resource for their own analysis and policy-making. An additional component of this indicator was that the Tamil diaspora activists learned the reasoning behind Sri Lanka related policies that were often not straightforward and followed their own logic and constraints. This was only possible because of the willingness and the cooperation of some donor representatives to share their insights off-the-record. Nevertheless, the established contacts were only made use of on an ad hoc and sporadic basis (as in the case of the Core Group). The policy papers that were generated in the course of the project and the narrative reports that contained a comprehensive analysis on the developments in the diaspora were read with interest by the policy makers. This indicator was also achieved successfully. **Source of information:** Feedback received from the BHC and other donors who participated at a Sri Lanka roundtable on the invitation of International Working Group on Sri Lanka, also participants appreciated the opportunity to have frank discussions with donor representatives.

4. Outputs

Outputs (***from original proposal)***	Indicator of success (***from original proposal)***	Result at the end of the project.

1.Policy papers and Diaspora Mapping for a better understanding of the complex "homeland-hostland" dynamics with regard to political/civil society activism of the Tamil diaspora	» A significant number of policy papers are generated based on the input of key Diaspora influentials drawn from multiple consultation sessions, expert panels and seminars » Diaspora Mapping of Tamil political activism	Nine papers have been written by academics and activists exploring the various themes of the project. A Diaspora mapping paper sets out the influential organisations within the Tamil Diaspora in the UK and their objectives for their work.

2.**Diaspora Dialogue workshops** and constructive engagement for a better understanding of the modes of mobilisation in main locations of the Tamil Diaspora and exploring the joint collaborative efforts within the Tamil Diaspora as well as with the Sinhala transnational community.	» Four Diaspora Dialogue workshops in UK examining multiple facets of the subject, bringing together key Diaspora members from around the world, policy makers and featuring experts in the field » Bringing together key Sinhala influentials with key Tamil Diaspora members in various settings (informal gathering, seminars, expert group etc)	Four workshops brought together a number of key Tamil influentials in the UK. In two workshops these influentials met resource persons from Sri Lanka and engaged in discussion on their activism. Despite the difficulties, a small number of Tamils and Sinhalese influentials met in one workshop organised by this part of the project, while others met at an event organised by the *[redacted]* as part of the overall project. Many Tamils felt that the time was not ripe for a genuine exchange.
3.**Learning lessons and sharing experiences** from similar diaspora formations in UK	A conference will be held that involve other communities to share lessons (e.g. Palestinians, Somali, Kurds, Eritrea)	An international workshop brought together Kashmiri, Kurdish and the Baluchs community and the Tamil activists to share lessonslearned and to exchange ideas on how best diaspora could support peace at home.

4.**Diaspora Core Group** as sounding board for policymakers	The project set up a Core Group and made them available to policy makers in the UK that would	The group was established in the first half of the project. The members were drawn from the key participants of
	function as a sounding board for policy makers.	the workshop. However, the potential of the group was not sufficiently used by the policy community.
5.**Publication** and dissemination of the project results	The results of the combined deliberations arising from policy research, comparative analysis and dialogue completed in the course of the project will be disseminated widely.	The project results are compiled in a comprehensive Internal evaluation Report (see attachment) and will be published as a hard-copy version in May 2011. Soft copy is available already.
6.		
7.		
8.		

5. Project Activities

Were all activities completed? If not, give details
Yes, all activities were completed

6. Project Expenditure

Planned Total Cost	344,187
Actual Total Cost	344,187

Variance (difference between planned cost and actual cost): 0

Please explain any difference between planned and actual expenditure, where the difference is greater than 5%

Was value for money achieved? Please explain how
Yes. The project was able to achieve its objectives and outputs despite the limited budget. The drop in the value in the British pound caused problems in relation to salaries of staff at *[redacted]* and the partner organisation CJPD, compelling the project to cut costs. This has not in any way affected the activities but contributed to the awareness of the need to be cost effective throughout the project. The project implementers were also flexible throughout the project to be of help to the British officials –both to FCO and the BHC- when they needed a detailed analysis of certain major diaspora events or details on particular diaspora formations/individuals.

7. Sustainability

What evidence do you have that the benefits of your project will be sustained? Please describe
The key political sections of the Tamil diaspora were involved at every stage of the project: project design, implementation, reflection and evaluation. With the active involvement of the Tamil diaspora in the project, we could ensure ownership, but, most of all, a certain level of sustainability. Conversations with the participants indicate that certain methodologies, concepts and ideas will be carried forward by the diaspora itself. The partnership with a Tamil Diaspora think-tank Centre for Just Peace and Democracy to implement the activities was an added-value. It is hoped that CJPD will carry forward many of the activities even in the absence of project funding.

8. Key Lessons Learned

What were the three main lessons learned that could be applicable to running this type of project again elsewhere?

The analysis of local diaspora politics has to incorporate global diaspora politics
The main change in Tamil diaspora politics since the violent escalation of the conflict in Sri Lanka in 2008 is its transnational focus. Within the global Tamil diaspora, it has been possible to observe an increasing tendency for transnational politics to gain momentum, while purely national politics (British Tamil politics or French Tamil politics) are fading away. While tailor-made campaigns and lobbying efforts (in the run-up to British parliamentary elections, for example) still played a role, it is within the global arena that Tamil diaspora politics is currently being shaped. Recent activities also suggest a move away from centrally organised protests to smaller, more spontaneous expressions of local opinion. Rather than formal organisations, social networks have become more important, not only in terms of how Tamils in the UK know when and where to gather for the larger protests, but also for organising smaller, locally-based gatherings or peaceful demonstrations that allow the Tamil diaspora to engage with their local non-Tamil communities. Any local (country-based) effort to engage with the Tamil diaspora has to include its global formations if it is to achieve any long-lasting impact. Any such effort must also find ways to cope with the more 'spontaneously' organised nature of Tamil political activism of the future.

2.**The gap between discourse in the diaspora and homeland has to be bridged**
Although there was a lively debate on whether the gap is a 'perceived' or a 'real' gap, diaspora members generally tended to agree that more interaction is needed between the diaspora and the Tamil polity in Sri Lanka to have a holistic understanding of the needs and aspirations of the people back home.

3.**The importance of steering a critical debate towards 'unpopular' topics:** In the series of workshops conducted with the diaspora, one of the central aims was to encourage the diaspora actors to reflect on their activism in a self-critical manner in order to become more effective. After a long period of trust-building, this was, to a great extent, achieved. However, the most critical topic now appears to be for the diaspora to assess its own role in the ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka, something that has not, to date, been openly debated.

We would welcome your feedback and comments on FCO procedures and systems in relation to this project.
We appreciated the support and help extended during the course of this project. BHC staff were always approachable and always happy to respond to questions and queries. Many thanks for your understanding and support.

Signed *[redacted]*

Name *[redacted]*……

Position Held Director…….

Implementing Organisation Name: *[redacted]*

[redacted]

m. Final Report- An Evaluation of *[redacted]* and CJPD- May 2011

Engaging the Tamil Diaspora for Peace

An Evaluation of a Project by *[redacted]*

and Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD)

Final report by *[redacted]*
Submitted the 2nd May 2011

Background

Between January 2009 and March 2011, *[redacted]*_ and Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD) carried out a pilot project aiming to "empower and strengthen the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora community to engage more actively to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict, to address internal differences and to explore ways and means to bring the Sinhala transnational community together with the Tamil Diaspora for mutual understanding, joint analysis and activities for peace-building". The project focused on the Tamil diaspora in the United Kingdom, and was funded by the British High Commission in Sri Lanka through the Conflict Prevention Pool of the British Government.

This is the report of an evaluation of the project, carried out in January-February 2011. The aim of the evaluation was to assess the relevance, output and impact of the project as well as to suggest strategies for the future.

This report first briefly explains our evaluation approach, then discusses the difficult and changing political context in Sri Lanka and the Diaspora, including the role of the diaspora in the conflict and in related peace-building activities. This will provide an understanding of the contextual challenges within which the project started. It will then assess the relevance, impact and coherence of the project, its approach and activities and look at outputs and impact of the project activities in relation to the project objectives. Thereafter it proceeds to discuss the project's coherence with other peace-building initiatives, monitoring and evaluation, partnerships, sustainability, participation and cost effectiveness. Finally, recommendations for future strategies and activities are given.

Evaluation Approach

The evaluation is mainly based on two types of information: first, the reading of documents produced by the project (bi-annual reports, workshop reports, research papers and minutes from meetings), and second, interviews. Altogether, fifteen interviews were carried out during January and February 2011, with the responsible staff at *[redacted]* and CJPD and the *[redacted]* representatives from the advisory committee of the project, the so-called core group of diaspora activists created by the project, participants in workshops and experts external to the project. Four of the interviews were carried out by phone, while the rest were conducted in London in January 2011.

Topics discussed in the interviews included: the interviewee's experiences and views of particular project activities, obstacles and achievements of the project and ideas about future activities. In addition to this, the interviews also dealt with the broader context of the project: perceptions of the role of the Tamil diaspora in peace-building in Sri Lanka, current dynamics of diaspora politics, needs for empowerment and capacity building of the diaspora and visions for the future. The scope of this evaluation is restricted by the limited scope of data collection. With the material and interviews at hand, the consultants are able to assess the different perceptions of the relevance, impact, and coherence of the project that different stakeholders involved in the project expressed.

Two points need highlighting here: first, our evaluation criteria have been aligned with the suggestions in the terms of reference: for example, we have looked at the consistency of project activities with the project goal and objectives, having in mind that the context of implementation was changing compared to the situation when the project was originally planned. For this part of the evaluation, the internally given measures of output and activities were taken as threshold. Second, for assessing the "impact" (relevance, coherence etc.) of this peace-building project, we follow the approach to collect and discuss "perceptions" of different stakeholders of the project, their views, understandings, experiences. In this sense, those perceptions cannot be assessed against an external "truth" criteria, but need to be taken as what they are: perceptions. Perceptions matter in every conflict context and therefore they provide a legitimate basis for analysis. However, given the limited scope of the evaluation, it was not possible to capture the broad spectrum of perceptions and therefore the documented perceptions in the report may not be fully representative for the whole spectrum of stakeholders involved in the project. These perceptions were then providing an input to our own analysis as evaluators. It is our view that a straight forward quantification of impact is not possible and also not helpful, given the pilot character of the project.

Context and Relevance: Engaging the Tamil diaspora for peace

The pilot project was challenged with fast changing frame conditions, which required a flexible approach in adjusting project objectives and activities to these changing ground conditions, both in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora. Any project which aims to contribute to peace-building in a context of armed conflict will have to adjust to a sometimes rapidly changing conflict context. This has been particularly so in the case of this project, as the situation in Sri Lanka shifted from the gradual breakdown of a ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE during the planning phase of the project (2007) to a dramatic escalation of violence and humanitarian crisis and a post-war situation after military victory of the Sri Lankan government during the implementation of the project (2009-2011). We will discuss some of the relevant issues below.

The project took its point of departure in the fact that the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, estimated to consist of up to one million persons, are powerful stakeholders in issues of peace and conflict in Sri Lanka. During the planning phase of the project, the power of the diaspora was relevant particularly in relation to its possibilities to influence the LTTE, *[redacted]* However, as the project took off in early 2009, the prospects for a negotiated solution to the conflict had diminished, and in May that year the Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE. The war hence ended, while many of the conflicts that had initiated and maintained the Tamil separatist struggle remained. In the last stages of the war and during the post-war era, the Tamil diaspora continued to be a crucial stakeholder in the developments in Sri Lanka. The strength of the diaspora was convincingly displayed in the massive mobilisation of protest against the humanitarian crisis caused by the Sri Lankan government's military advances. The United Kingdom was one of several diaspora countries which saw mass protests. In the UK a 73 day demonstration in Parliament Square, hunger strikes, rallies and advocacy by diaspora Tamils, together with the grave humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka, contributed to giving the Tamil issue attention both in the media and among top political leaders.

After the end of the war, the significance of the Tamil diaspora for a future political settlement in Sri Lanka remains great or might even have increased. The Sri Lankan government has defined the Tamil diaspora a main "enemy", fearing that it could instigate a new armed struggle in the island, and resenting its international campaigns to hold Sri Lankan leaders accountable for war crimes and human rights abuses. Independent observers have noted that the Tamil diaspora continues to take "extremist" positions, as it maintains its demand of an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka, and warns that diaspora activism may threaten the stability in Sri Lanka.[2] Leading Tamil diaspora activists, on their side, perceive their role as crucial, arguing that Tamils in Sri Lanka are silenced due to the lack of credible Tamil representatives and freedom of speech in the island, and that therefore the task falls upon the diaspora to voice the concerns of Tamils and to continue the struggle for their rights.

The project's objectives, in particular in the changing political conditions, need to be contextualized within the variety of ideas that exist in Sri Lanka and the diaspora about what needs to be done to bring about "a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict". This project has aimed to "empower and strengthen the Tamil diaspora community to engage more actively to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict". While the Sri Lankan government and large sections of the Sinhalese (and possibly Muslim) population in Sri Lanka, as well as those segments of the Tamil community siding with the government, argue that the defeat of the LTTE has in fact led to peace in Sri Lanka, numerous Tamil diaspora activists argue that the conflict is not solved and that to achieve a just and sustainable peace, a separate Tamil state has to be created. Rather than be taken for granted, the definition of peace and the ideas of how to achieve peace have to be continuously discussed, in Sri Lanka, in the diaspora, and within this particular project. The relevance of "empowering the diaspora to engage for peace" will hence be deemed different depending on what definition of peace one subscribes to.

The project aimed at providing space for those segments of the diaspora which were interested to widen their knowledge on peaceful options to "the problem". The project initially departed from a recognition of the need for a negotiated settlement (rather than military solution), and, in the post-war situation, the acknowledgement that the end of war does not mean the end of conflict. Its approach to empowering the diaspora came from an understanding of "empowerment" as enabling the diaspora to reflect upon its situation, strategise about its future role and to start "thinking outside the boxes", i.e. overcome a purely antagonizing approach to solving the conflict in Sri Lanka. This is reflected in the project's objectives to encourage a "pro-active, positive role in contributing to sustainable peace" as against a hardline, nationalist, pro-separatist position.

Outputs and impact

Given the sensitive political context and the limited scope of the project, its outputs and achievements are remarkable and the "impact" is, given these conditions, more than reasonable. It needs emphasizing that the project was of a pilot character, limited in funding, duration and scope and that it had to adjust its planning to the changing (and unforeseeable) dynamics of hostland-homeland dynamics that the final battle and the subsequent end of war generated. In this sense, the project provided a timely intervention into a highly volatile social setting. Below, we briefly comment on the relevance of the five main project activities (as laid out in the project proposal). Generally, it is a great achievement that the project activities could be carried out according to slightly adjusted plans (with a change in timing in some cases) and the project objectives could be maintained to such a large extent, in spite of the dramatic changes in the conflict context in Sri Lanka.

This section evaluates the outputs and "impacts" of the five main project components and activities, before discussing the impact of the project in more general terms. Again, this assessment needs to be qualified, given the limited scope of the pilot project, and given the limitations in data available to assess "impact". In this sense, we provide a reflection on different perceptions of what the project has achieved as discussed with us in our stakeholder interviews.

Output and impact of project activities

• *Policy papers and diaspora mapping to gain a better understanding of homeland-hostland dynamics in relation to diaspora activism*

Output:
Eleven research papers have been produced in this project, nine of which were written by activists. A thorough mapping of diaspora activism in the UK has also been carried out. Some of the papers have been presented in the diaspora dialogue workshops. A paper on the dynamics of post-war transnational Tamil politics was published as a *[redacted]*Occasional Paper in 2010.[3] The rest of the research papers and the diaspora mapping await publication and distribution. The key target group for these publications were politically influential key opinion makers within the diaspora and the donor community.

Action research, or the close connection between research and activism, has been a key idea in this project, and the research and policy papers were intended to create a platform for activists to circulate and exchange their ideas, and to lobby for diaspora needs with policy makers. All papers were circulated to donor circles and informally within diaspora circles, but not beyond. A challenge has however been to get the activist papers to conform to academic quality standards for publication. The publication process has also been delayed by the sensitive nature of the topic.

"Impact":
While some workshop participants perceived the papers distributed as useful, it was clear that they had not, at the time of the evaluation, reached a wider audience. The impact of the papers and the research will depend on the extent to which they are disseminated and thereby can contribute

to deepening the knowledge of researchers and inform the strategies of policy makers and activists. However, the research has at least to some extent been discussed by activists in the workshops, while activists have also contributed papers and other input to the research exercise. The papers have also been discussed in the advisory committee and have been distributed by the respective authors in their own circles. The *[redacted]*_ published in 2010, seems to have generated some significant debate within diaspora circles. At the same time there has been a reluctance to disseminate the results of the diaspora mapping, for instance, for reasons of political sensitivity. Such documents remained useful, however, for internal planning purposes and for informing selected policy makers about the dynamics in the diaspora.

It has certainly been useful to provide the British Government with background information on the diaspora, the key ideas of influential figures within it in order to raise its understanding of diaspora activism. Obviously, representatives of the British High Commission in Sri Lanka have received and keenly read the material produced by the project, and one outcome of the project has thereby been to increase the knowledge on the dynamics of Tamil diaspora politics with representatives of the British government. By that, the *[redacted]* has been able to provide a channel of information exchange between the British government and diaspora Tamils, and may by that have contributed to shaping the thinking of the donor community.

While the focus of the project on reaching "politically influential" key persons in the diaspora and the donor community may be consistent with the project approach, we would like to raise some concerns about how the project could reconsider or broaden its focus on who needs "a better understanding of homeland-hostland dynamics" – and to reach beyond a rather small, but certainly influential group of activists in the diaspora. It may, for example, be considered what alternative publication formats may be developed (e.g. short briefs, opinion pieces, other dissemination channels) that would reach beyond an academically trained and skilled audience in the diaspora, i.e. to reach out to a much larger audience. This could broaden the political debate beyond some influential gatekeepers of the diaspora who broker the interfaces with the world outside of the diaspora. Also, some of the publications should be made available to a wider audience, in particular researchers and policy makers beyond the immediate donor community.

• *Diaspora dialogue workshops aiming to better understand the modes of political mobilisation, explore possibility for joint collaborative efforts within the Tamil diaspora, and with the Sinhala transnational community, and understand the relationship between the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora*

Output:
Five workshops were planned in the project, and all these workshops were also carried out, although the timing had to be changed in order to comply with the dramatic events in Sri Lanka. The workshops focused on (1) Political identity in the Tamil diaspora in the UK, (2) Tamil political activism in the UK post 9/11, (3) Possibilities and limitations of Tamil diaspora engagement for sustainable peace in Sri Lanka, (4) Challenges and opportunities in rehabilitation and development and the role of the diaspora (organised by *[redacted]*), and (5) Sharing across diaspora formations. In all workshops efforts were made to gather a group of key persons, while making sure that participants had different political backgrounds, gender and age. Efforts were made to invite diaspora activist with opposing views on key issues, and this was successful to a limited extent, given the highly polarized political landscape after the end of war.

Impact:
Bringing diaspora activists from different political camps together could be seen as an achievement in itself, although some organisers and participants had hoped for more participants and more diversity. The project's idea behind organizing these dialogue workshops was to provide space for reflection, as well as opportunities to meet and discuss with other activists. This tunes in with the empowerment approach that focuses on providing participants with better knowledge on multiple peaceful options for engagement, and secondly, by understanding and learning to acknowledge other, also adversarial, positions.

Assessing the impact of these workshops is difficult, because of the pilot character of the project. While different stakeholders are brought together in a specific workshop space, they thereafter individually return to their specific context within which they carry out their activist work. In how far the workshop space affects their perceptions, attitudes and their activist work is therefore difficult to assess. It is therefore not surprising that the workshop participants expressed a variety of views about the impact of these workshops. Some interviewees suggested that they were engaged in several diaspora forums already. Others, however, asserted that the *[redacted]* /CJPD workshops enabled new and valuable reflections and contacts. Workshop participants also expressed their appreciation for the workshop facilitation, especially the facilitator himself, and the discussion methodology. The workshops in themselves are likely to have been too brief and too few to instigate any significant change in the attitudes or behaviour of individuals. When asked about this, workshop participants instead related their increased awareness of diaspora agency to the broader developments of diaspora mobilisation and influence in the end phase of the war.

It is important to notice that bringing people together does not necessarily mean that there is a safe space for open discussion. The shared understanding by many of the workshop participants allowed for relatively open and self-critical discussions, but there were also participants who perceived that certain issues were left unsaid. Feelings that there are tensions within the Tamil diaspora and that people cannot always talk freely need to be taken seriously in order to avoid that workshops end up reconfirming to participants that dialogue is dangerous instead of providing safe space for dialogue. One issue that some workshop participants raised was the question of "insider/outsider" in the sense that *[redacted]*-CJPD were considered as a "project" and an "NGO", which was not an indigenous organisation from "within" the diaspora. Those participants suggested that activists might be more motivated to participate if the discussions lead to something practical (e.g. the carrying out of development projects). This raises the question of the adequate organisational setting and format of empowerment in the diaspora and what function a "project" can play in the setting of diaspora activism.

When it comes to the objectives of using the workshop to create a better understanding of the relationship between the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora this seems not to have been achieved to any larger extent. This may be due to the fact that the LTTE ceased to exist as an all-dominant force in Tamil politics after May 2009, but also with the fact that it is difficult to talk about an organisation considered a terrorist group by the UK authorities.

The objective of exploring possibilities for collaboration between the Tamil diaspora and the Sinhala transnational community was pursued in one half-day workshop, which was organised by *[redacted]* (as CJPD did not agree to the ambition to bring Sinhalese and Tamils together). This was considered controversial in Tamil circles, and the focus of the discussion was agreed to be development and rehabilitation (rather than peace-building) for this reason. That fourteen participants attended is considered an achievement, and the discussions were perceived as constructive. This indicates the delicate balancing act of bringing together opposing or even adversarial parties while not confining the space to talk. Overall, however, the attitude of the participants was positive. Although *[redacted]* did not plan any follow-up activities, participants seem to have been keen to keep contact and to remain in touch.

• *Learning lessons and sharing experiences from similar diaspora formations in the UK*

Output:

The last workshop, held in October 2010, aimed to share knowledge and experiences across different diaspora formations, and attracted participants from the Tamil, Kashmiri, Kurdish, and Baluch diasporas.

Impact:
Overall, the Tamil participants interviewed saw this as a good learning experience, which served to put the difficulties of Tamil diaspora organisation in perspective, and they recognised the shared concerns of criminalisation of diaspora communities through the terrorism legislation. After the workshop, participants expressed an interest for further workshops in this field, but with a stronger focus on concrete issues and topics. Some new ideas about initiatives to link Tamil and other diaspora organizations emerged as well as a result of the workshops.

In our interviews, some reservations were voiced as to how useful this exposure was for Tamil diaspora politics. While it was generally acknowledged that the workshop gave good food for thought, there was concern that it did not lead to any in-depth collaboration, and was not so productive in addressing the key issues faced by Tamils. As the Tamil activists are deeply concerned with the Tamil issue, but often less interested in the struggles of other communities, it is important that it is clear how experiences of other diaspora communities can inform Tamil activism strategies. One interviewee commented that Tamils in the UK prioritise working with the host community, rather than with other diaspora communities.

• Establish a core group of "multipliers and agents of peaceful change", which will create a critical mass of diaspora members who engage in sustained political discourses with a broad spectrum of stakeholders in the Sri Lankan conflict

Output:
The establishment of the group was the explicit wish of the BHC in the inception of the project. A core group was established *[redacted]*. There was some attempt to represent the diversity of views and political affiliations, viewpoints that exist in the diaspora in the composition of the group members. According to the terms of reference of the Core Group, *[redacted]* and CJPD only provided logistical support, but all content issues were to be decided solely by the Core Group members themselves. *[redacted]* and CJPD also had limited leverage on the group's composition itself, as the group was free to include new members if it wished to do so.

Impact:
This is the component of the project which seems to have been least successful. A main problem was that the purpose of this group was very unclear. Although the project proposal suggested that this would be a group which could catalyse peaceful change by engaging a broad spectrum of stakeholders in the Sri Lankan conflict, the way it was understood by the interviewees (both core group member and representatives of *[redacted]* and CJPD) was that this was a group formed on request by the British government (British High Commission in Colombo and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London), who wished to have this group as a sounding board and a contact point with the Tamil diaspora. However, the lack of clarity on the purpose of the existence of the group, and the subsequent lack of interest from the British government to actually make use of the group made the group members decide, after having held two meetings, to cease its activities until receiving further information from the British government. A reason for the lack of interest by the British was the large staff turn-over at the High Commission. There was only one occasion when the British High Commission made use of the core group, turning to it to find a person who could represent the Tamil diaspora in a delegation to Sri Lanka. The core group meetings did enable some space for sharing views among its members. The participants were positive to the idea of being linked up to and listened to by the British government, but with the lack of interest from the government's side they saw the group meetings as a waste of time. The changing conflict context in Sri Lanka and effective lobbying efforts by diaspora Tamils had made the need for the *[redacted]* /CJPD project to provide a bridge between the British government and the Tamil diaspora redundant, as diaspora Tamils already had good access to British government representatives.

• *Publications and dissemination of results of policy research, comparative analysis and dialogue during project*

Output (and impact):
Apart from the publication of *[redacted]* and the presentation of some research papers in workshops, the output of this project component had not yet been generated at the time of the evaluation. As discussed above, one obstacle to publication and dissemination has been the sensitive nature of the topic. Essential for this component to have an impact will be that the results of the research, analysis and dialogue experiences get published and are made accessible to various target groups. However, the *[redacted]* has generated some interesting discussions within the diaspora as it was widely circulated.

Impact in a broader sense

It is hard to imagine a diaspora community engaging more actively for peace, than the Tamils in the UK did during the end phase of the war (and the beginning of the project). However, the diaspora activists were criticised for ignoring LTTE atrocities and that their activism hence was less an expression of support for peace than support for the LTTE. After the demise of the LTTE, diaspora activism did no longer run the same risk of being considered terrorist supporters.

Tracing the impact of the project in relation to the overall objective to "empower and strengthen the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community to engage more actively to bring about a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict" has to take into account the broader developments in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora. During the project period, it is fair to say that the diaspora has been both empowered and (to some extent) disempowered. The successful mobilisation of large numbers of Tamils during the last phase of the war, the continued political awareness and commitment of the diaspora (including the second generation) for just peace in Sri Lanka, and the achievements in gaining access to power holders (visible not least during the inauguration meeting of *[redacted]* parliament which had an impressive participation of British government representatives and MPs) and getting attention in mainstream media can be seen as a major empowerment of the diaspora. The Tamil diaspora in the UK has in the last few years become much more efficient in mobilisation of protest as well as in advocacy. However, the failure to make the massive mobilisation and lobbying efforts translate into actual interventions and changes on the ground in Sri Lanka have made some sections of the diaspora feel "disempowered".

In this context, we would like to reconsider the three core components of the project's objectives in the form of the following questions. We do this as some interviewees raised this critically during the evaluation: Does the diaspora need to be "empowered"? Does it need to "address internal differences"? And is it relevant to bring diaspora Tamils and Sinhalese together "for mutual understanding, joint analysis and activities for peace-building"?

<u>Does the diaspora need to be "empowered"?</u>

[redacted] and CJPD approached "empowerment" in the sense of encouraging the diaspora to "think outside the boxes" and thereby to be able to enlarge their potential options what to do as a diaspora (sub-group). In that sense, it can be provocative and thereby be perceived as being

imposed from the outside - and thereby somewhat patronizing. We do not question the usefulness of this approach to empowerment and generally, the contributions that reflection, research, documentation and spaces for discussions make in this regard.

Nevertheless, that reservations were expressed to us – as indicated above - should be taken seriously. One interviewee said – and this quote, albeit not representative, illustrates a core dilemma implicit in the empowerment approach: "The Tamil diaspora does not need anyone to empower it. It should empower itself. The idea of intervening to empower the diaspora is a patronising approach, a top-down approach. We need to engage the diaspora, invite it to take a seat [in decision-making], not empower it." Another interviewee pointed out that there was no clear logic as to why a *[redacted]*_organisation (*[redacted]*_ and CJPD) should "empower" the Tamil diaspora "in the UK." Such statements suggest that while there is a wide-spread perception that Tamil diaspora activism undergoes a phase of re-orientation, such phases are periods of struggle over hegemony and control. While*[redacted]'* s point is that self-critical reflection could be a tool of empowerment in such situations, some segments may perceive the "project" of more formal organizations, such as *[redacted]*_or CJPD. NGOs, which are getting money to "do projects", in this perception, are different to what activists do.

This is related to the question of who can bring empowerment and whether or not "outside" organisations can play a role in this. We do not find the insider-outsider distinction very useful but think that organizations who work in the diaspora need to reflect upon their positionality as they are often at the same time "outsiders" (in the sense of "a project") and "insiders" as some of their staff are diaspora members. We discuss this point in more depth in the lessons learnt section.

Does it need to "address internal differences" within the Tamil diaspora? The interviews showed divided opinions on this. The demise of the LTTE drastically changed the modes of diaspora organisation, and various initiatives to pursue Tamil rights post-LTTE have indicated that there is a fragmentation of diaspora organisation and a struggle over leadership. However, many interviewees argued that this is not necessarily a problem, since most diaspora activists and organisations are in agreement about key issues (such as that the conflict remains in spite of the war being over, the need for substantial power-sharing or self-determinations for Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the significant role of the Tamil diaspora in continuing to address the problems in Sri Lanka).

We tend to agree with the project's approach that, while there may be a tendency to downplay internal divisions within the diaspora by diaspora activists (as this may be considered as a sign of weakness), the project's stance to make the diversity and differences within the diaspora more

transparent is worth supporting, in particular to increase willingness to reflect such diversity and to embrace it constructively. As the project's reports indicate, there are vast differences within the diaspora as to what political action should be prioritized, what the end goal of such action should be, which strategies and tactics are most effective to achieve these ends, who the legitimate (new) leaders could be to lead such action etc.

At the same time, we come back here to the dilemma of empowerment as "thinking outside the boxes" – as such pro-active approach by an "outside" organization can also create animosity or a feeling to being pushed by outsiders to acknowledge sensitive, or unpopular "truths".

Is it relevant to bring diaspora Tamils and Sinhalese together "for mutual understanding, joint analysis and activities for peace-building"?
Bringing the two diaspora communities together remains of a great strategic importance, as only through a significant change within the Sinhalese community, both in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora vis-à-vis Tamil rights, grievances and needs can there be a political solution in Sri Lanka. There are different views on the usefulness of such engagement, however. Some analysts argue that Sinhalese-Tamil dialogue, starting in the diaspora, can be useful to (a) initiate contacts and processes that could eventually lead to increased understanding and reconciliation between divided communities, and (b) gain support for Tamil rights among sympathetic sections of the Sinhalese community. While there was willingness among a significant section of the Tamil diaspora activists to participate in the workshop, a strong view among many diaspora Tamils prevails that Sinhalese-Tamil dialogue is not fruitful as long as power relations remain extremely unbalanced, as has been the case in the wake of the Sri Lankan government's victory and the upsurge of Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka (and in the diaspora). Dialogue under the conditions of "Sinhalese" victory would only serve the interests of the Sinhalese, and risk giving the impression of "inter-ethnic harmony" while ignoring Tamil grievances and rights. Many diaspora Tamils would hence argue that the timing is not right for initiating Tamil-Sinhalese dialogue. Also, some Tamils are suspicious that Sinhalese diaspora members could have a link with the Sri Lankan government and secret forces and that them being outspoken could backfire some day as information may be forwarded to those (violating, of course, the self-imposed Chatham house rule). At least, as a fear, whether justified or not, this needs to be taken seriously.

Cross-cutting issues

This section briefly discusses other issues relevant to consider in the evaluation, starting with the project's coherence with other peace-building initiatives. Thereafter it comments on monitoring and evaluation, partnerships, sustainability, participation and cost effectiveness.

Coherence with other peace-building initiatives

This project has been carried out in a policy area which is quite contradictory. When looking at UK policy towards peace-building in Sri Lanka, we find on the one hand an emphasis on human rights, calls for a ceasefire in the end phase of the war and *[redacted]*_ withdrawal of the*[redacted]*_ on the basis of the Sri Lankan government's failure to live up to human rights standards. On the other hand, the UK is the EU country that has exported most arms to the Sri Lankan government,[4] and the British government also provided funds for the IDP camps in which Tamil civilians were held incarcerated for months after the end of the war.

The project objectives and activities did not contradict the activities carried out by Tamil activists and organisations in relation to the conflict and post-war situation in Sri Lanka, but have complemented it with a focus on peace-building, reflection and research. When it comes to coherence with the *[redacted]* diaspora project which the *[redacted]*/CJPD project is funded together with (through the *[redacted]*, the two projects partly complement each other (the *[redacted]*/CJPD focusing on Tamil key persons, and *[redacted]* more broadly engaging business persons and second generation diasporans), and partly build on contradictory logics; the *[redacted]* project ignores ethnic/national identity in its targeting of a diaspora constituency for peace-building, while *[redacted]* /CJPD recognises the importance of engaging with Tamil diaspora activists and taking an explicitly intra-community (Tamil) perspective, which builds on the core premise that the communities themselves are diverse and working with one community was considered a first step in a sequence that would subsequently bring both communities together.

Monitoring and evaluation

The project has had a number of mechanisms to critically reflect on progress, achievements and risks. The advisory committee, consisting of established academics served as a sounding board which continuously discussed strategies in relation to new developments, but also evaluated and commented on research and policy papers. The collaboration with *[redacted]* through the *[redacted]*/ mechanism also provided space for reflection over project priorities and obstacles. In the beginning of the project, regular*[redacted]*/ allowed *[redacted]*/staff to discuss and reflect, but these meetings became less frequent during the last phase of the project. The bi-annual progress reports submitted to the donors also provided opportunities for an analysis of the project. The reports are well written and important since they do not only deal with the project itself, but also makes good analysis of the more general dynamics of the diaspora which impacts on the project and which the project wishes to have an impact on. Moreover, feedback sessions after each workshops and workshop reports have also been helpful in monitoring and evaluating progress. Finally, this evaluation at the end of the project period assesses outcomes, impact, relevance and numerous other aspects of the project. With the limited scope of the project, it is unreasonable to expect more extensive mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. The competence, long

experience of working with the Tamil diaspora and analytical skills of the representatives of *[redacted]* and CJPD have been of immense importance for providing continuous monitoring of good quality.

Sustainability

Given the pilot character of the project, this is a more than reasonable outcome and more sustainable outputs would require a long-term, better funded project, which would have to reach beyond the immediate diaspora activist circles. The sustainability of "impact" is difficult to assess at this stage, given the pilot character of the project and given the difficulty to link "impact" to empowerment activities. Given that the project's original ideas were jointly developed by some key diaspora figures, mainly those involved in CJPD's advisory meeting, and *[redacted]* , the project's contributions add to ongoing other activities of diaspora activists and complement them. At the same time, as some stakeholders considered *[redacted]* and CJPD to be an outside "project", this perception may limit the sustainability of activities in some segments of the diaspora. How much impact on views, perceptions and capabilities of individual stakeholders the different workshops have achieved and how these will make use of these enhanced skills and knowledges is difficult to assess from the available information. Certainly, some of the connections made and discussions initiated in the diaspora dialogue workshops may continue after the end of the project, while the production of action research is unlikely to prevail by itself without further funding. There are some moves from some segments of the diaspora who have asked for further assistance by*[redacted]* as it is considered to provide a good platform for knowledge exchange. The core group created turned out not to be sustainable in the long run for the reasons given above.

Partnerships, participation and ownership

The project has involved a number of partnerships: between *[redacted]* and CJPD as implementing organisations, as well as between *[redacted]* and *[redacted]* through the*[redacted* structure. The collaboration between *[redacted]* and CJPD made sense since both organisations had research experience, *[redacted]* could contribute crucial contacts and experiences with donors, while the CJPD is a Tamil diaspora organisation making the project a Tamil-to-Tamil intervention. Putting the *[redacted]* together under the shared administrative structure of the CDE enabled sharing of knowledge and a mechanism for reflections. However, this dialogue or the*[redacted]*/ in general did not seem to have added much to (nor interfered with) the *[redacted]*_/CJPD project implementation (apart from being an administrative necessity) (see separate *[redacted]*/evaluation report).

The project has been formulated and carried out with the participation of a number of other key actors, in particular some segments of the diaspora, which have been involved in CJPD's advisory meetings with participants from UK, *[redacted]*. The project idea was in line with an interest among *[redacted]* in diaspora politics and peace-building. Throughout the project period, *[redacted]*/ has shared experiences with governments and networks interested in the situation in Sri Lanka, for instance by taking part in three round tables organised by*[redacted]* on Sri Lanka. *[redacted]* also maintains contacts with a new *[redacted]* and other civil society bodies in Sri Lanka (*[redacted]* and a number of individuals). Such contacts have served as a sounding board for the project and as spaces to share experiences. The project proposal was written in collaboration between *[redacted]* and CJPD. During the project, the diaspora mapping and preparation for workshops included consultation with diaspora activists that made up the target group of the project.

High expectations existed among many circles (in the diaspora but also in the donor community) concerning what the project should be doing and performing. It was beyond the scope of the project to address and adequately respond to these high expectations. In the interviews it became clear that there were different interpretations of what the project should be doing, quite independent from the project´s own objectives and rationale. This risked creating a certain level of frustration and disappointment. One key purpose according to the (*[redacted]* and CJPD was for the British government to gain information about Tamil diaspora politics, and have access to the views of influential diaspora activists in order to realize the importance of the diaspora in domestic and foreign policy and to provide channels of communication between the British government and segments of the diaspora. Another objective of the project, which often was not explicitly spelled out, was to encourage key diaspora persons to take on "more constructive" attitudes and behaviours in order to contribute to peace-building in Sri Lanka (i.e. to renounce violence and to be less rigid on the separatism demand). Bringing Sinhalese and Tamils in the diaspora together for dialogue was also an objective, from the point of view of the donors and the (*[redacted].*

When talking to core group members and workshop participants, however, their motivation for the engagement in this project segment was to facilitate their contacts with the British government, and thereby enable them to influence it and create awareness of the importance and competence of the Tamil diaspora. This hope of talking to and influencing the British government (and through (*[redacted]* possibly other stakeholders too) was not achieved to their satisfaction. . When the British government showed limited interest in listening to the diaspora, participants were

disappointed. There were complaints that they did not receive feedback from (*[redacted]*, CJPD and the British government, although they had made themselves available and shared information to these actors.

Cost effectiveness

With the limited budget and for being a two years pilot project the activities and outputs have been reasonable. The drop in the value of the British pound caused problems in relation to salaries of staff at (*[redacted]* and CJPD, forcing the project to cut costs. This has not in any major way affected the activities of the project, but contributed to an awareness of the need to be cost-effective throughout the implementation of the project.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

Almost two years after the end of the war, the situation in Sri Lanka cannot be defined as one of sustainable peace. The Sri Lankan government's lack of interest to reform the political system to cater to Tamil demands for devolution of power and to pursue justice for the victims of war, has meant that minority grievances prevail. At the same time, curtailed freedom of speech and increased concentration of power have instigated new grievances, not only among Tamils. The continued mobilisation of Tamil diaspora protests and the formation of a Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam and other Tamil diaspora initiatives globally indicate that the diaspora is still a crucial player in the conflict. Whether diaspora activism and organisation will be able to find constructive and efficient ways to support the rights and wellbeing of Tamils in Sri Lanka is still an open question.

The impact of the project is likely to have been complementary to these already existing activities of the diaspora, but probably limited in scope and impact - something which is not surprising, given the limited magnitude of the project. Overall, it can be concluded that the empowerment (and disempowerment) of the diaspora that did take place during the project period was to a large extent a result of the changing ground conditions of the end of war and the high media attention that this generated in the host countries of the diaspora. As a result of this, the Tamil diaspora in the UK can generally be seen as having been "empowered" and more active (than before the end phase of the war in Sri Lanka) in engaging for peace in Sri Lanka, as has also been the main objective of the project. In particular, the project can be seen as having made a significant contribution in taking some diaspora activists into exploring new directions, "thinking outside the boxes" through providing useful input in the form of spaces for

reflection, research and documentation. In how far these inputs have resulted in changing mindsets of the involved stakeholders or in how far the new ideas generated have spilled over beyond the limited confines of the involved activist circles is difficult to assess at this point, but would be instrumental for a follow-up project, we believe: to broaden the appeal and impact of its activities beyond a small group of activists and policy makers.

Some key lessons learnt

It is unrealistic to expect a relatively small-scale and time-limited project to reach an ambitious objective such as "empowering the diaspora" or "contributing to peace in Sri Lanka".

What it can do, however, is to contribute towards these ends as part of larger processes. During the last few years, the Tamil diaspora in the UK has been empowered in the sense that it has become far more efficient in mobilisation and lobbying. It is more visible and has through politically active Tamils access to power-holders. This empowerment, however, cannot be attributed to the project, but has come about mainly because of the developments in Sri Lanka, the efficiency of diaspora organisations and the attention given globally to the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka. However, the project can be seen to have contributed, in a limited way, to supporting the process of empowerment by initiating self-reflection among some influential diaspora activists and providing valuable documentation of the dynamics of diaspora politics in the crucial phase at the end of and just after the war. In particular, the ([redacted]_ has steered some discussion in the diaspora activist community about formerly unsaid or controversial topics, such as dealing with the past, reassessing the role of the diaspora during the years of war and forging alliances with likeminded Sinhalese. The project has also to some extent functioned as a bridge conveying information about the Tamil diaspora to British government representatives. Moreover, the project has produced research which is useful for academics, policy makers and diaspora activists – it is now important that it is disseminated in a way that ensures that it reaches these target groups. The project has also initiated dialogue within the Tamil diaspora, and to a more limited extent between diaspora Tamils and Sinhalese.

The "positionality" of an organization's staff is critical in determining access to and acceptance among different segments of the diaspora.

The long-term commitment of ([redacted] and CJPD to Tamil diaspora issues and the skilled and well-connected staff of the two organisations were crucial in the carrying out of the project, although this has also repercussions about how the project has been perceived in the sense of where its key Tamil figures have been located political (within Tamil politics and diaspora politics). A point, which has been discussed in the interviews is that of a possible perception of political bias of the "project" – based on the political past and present positions of its two main organisations,

([redacted] and CJPD. The perceived political bias certainly differs with respect to ([redacted] and CJPD. One objective of ([redacted] was also to initiate a self-critical reflection within CJPD of its political positions and own biases. At the same time, CJPD was instrumental to reach out to political Diaspora formations. Our view on this is that anyone who organizes such workshops needs to consider how he or she (or the organization, the facilitator) is perceived within the diaspora, in particular when some of its project staff or facilitators is Tamil. Any such staff will be evaluated by potential workshop participants and stakeholders against their political position and past alignments as well as their family histories (and the political histories of those). But rather then framing such issues around an "insider-outsider" dichotomy, we suggest that organizations need to reflect about their "positionality" – both as organization and of its individual staff members (both Tamil and non-Tamil). Positionality also means that perceptions about a particular person's or organization's political positioning, objectives, assumed "hidden agendas" etc. will differ among different segments of the diaspora. It is therefore not so much an "insider-outsider" dichotomy, but a more multi-faceted positionality, which defines the most useful spaces for engagement. The important point is that ([redacted] reflects critically on this positionality and strategically discusses how this positionality confines its access and capabilities to work in the diaspora and how it can maximize its impact through a project focus, which reflects it.

To achieve impact in a follow-up project, ([redacted] needs to think about a more sequenced approach. Although it is hard to pinpoint the exact impact of this particular project in relation to the empowerment of the diaspora, the intervention has been relevant and could be fruitfully developed into further engagement with the diaspora. Workshops have limited impact on the individual activities of its participants after the workshop has been completed. Follow-up activities could include capacity building and training components as well as a low-key "presence" in activist spaces. This would also include a re-strategizing about how to reach beyond the known segments of diaspora activists. New methods of engagement may be required, e.g. also using modern IT technologies of networking and engagement.

Strategic areas for continued diaspora engagement

We strongly recommend a prolongation of this project, given the important role and level of activity of the Tamil diaspora, continued engagement with diaspora activists will be important.

For the next phase, we suggest a continued focus on capacity building and action research but with a more focused approach, and more clarity regarding who is to benefit from the capacity building and research. As within the Tamil diaspora, increasingly transnational formations (such as the ([redacted]) are gaining more influence in agenda setting, a follow-up project would have to take this transnational dimension of diaspora into account. This could certainly be combined with a certain focus on the Tamil diaspora in the UK, since this remains a main hub for Tamil diaspora politics. The first two years of the project engaged with the diaspora around rather broad discussions about identity, activism, lessons learnt from other diasporas etc.

We highlight a number of possible fields of engagement for a future project, but we also strongly recommend that a future project focuses on one or two of these fields only. Secondly, we recommend that a future project carefully thinks about how to broaden its outreach to segments of the diaspora community beyond those who have so far been involved in the project in particular given the multiple re-alignments of Tamil diaspora politics that is currently under way.

(a) The democratisation of Tamil diaspora and the diaspora-homeland nexus:
Post-2009 a process of "democratisation" of the Tamil diaspora organisations has been initiated, partly as a way for diaspora activists to distance themselves from the legacy of the LTTE and the terrorism label, partly as a way to reinstate the Tamil diaspora commitment to just peace and an independent state in Sri Lanka. The creation of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam and the election of representatives to it, the formation of country councils in main diaspora countries, and the referenda on support for independence have been examples of these processes. At the same time, there is a democratic dilemma in the widespread idea that it is the diaspora Tamils who have to voice the concerns of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, as there is a lack of freedom of speech and space to act politically in the homeland. Three subfield appear of strategic importance to us:

First, the links between activist politics in the diaspora and Tamil politics in Sri Lanka need to be better connected. While numerous informal and mostly individual contacts exist between activists in the diaspora and people at home (family, activists, politicians), there seems to be a need to make these interactions more strategic to serve peace-building purposes. This has created a gap between political discourses among activists in the diaspora and political discourses among Tamil politicians and activists in Sri Lanka. Bringing selected individuals from both camps together to create a shared understanding of each others' ideas, hopes, fears, but also options, scope for action and possible opportunities for change would be a useful contribution to provide a more coherent and possibly more constructive role of Tamil politics both in the diaspora and in Sri Lanka. Dialogue with political parties, civil society and academics in Sri Lanka would be useful as a way to problematise the links between homeland and

hostland, and to give diaspora Tamils insights about the room of manoeuvre (or lack of it) for Tamil politics in Sri Lanka. Although there is in many ways close connections between diaspora Tamils and Tamils in Sri Lanka (as many interviewees pointed out), more systematic analysis of options and experiences of Tamils in Sri Lanka is likely to be useful. Research by independent academics into the situation of Tamils post-2009 would be fruitful to make use of, as well as (if possible) study visits to Sri Lanka and the creation of space for critical discussions on the situation in Sri Lanka post-2009. In discussions on the situation in Sri Lanka it may be possible also to invite representatives of the Sinhalese transnational community who also take a critical approach to post-war developments in Sri Lanka.

Second, some core dilemmas in relation to processes of democratic representation could be addressed more strategically. One approach could be to look at practical experiences of other diaspora formations in how they form democratic organisations and how they deal with the homeland-diaspora relationship in relation to representation. This can be done both through research (which should be published and disseminated in a way that effectively reaches diaspora activists), and through workshops or seminars in which diaspora activists can learn more about these experiences and relate it to the challenges they face in their own organisations and situation.

Third, the referenda carried out in a number of countries with a large Tamil diaspora indicate that there is an overwhelming support for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka among the diaspora. The creation of a Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam is a new initiative which challenges the idea of existing state structures. The situation in Sri Lanka and the views of the international community, however indicate that a separate Tamil state is a very unrealistic aspiration in the current context. *[redacted]*Also here, a combination of research, and capacity building workshops/seminars with experts on these topics could be useful.

(b) Dealing with the past: Pursuing accountability and justice in the international arena

One key task taken on by diaspora activists has been the pursuit of justice for the war victims in Sri Lanka. Since the Sri Lankan government has denied that there were any civilian atrocities in the end phase of the war, and since impunity continues to prevail in Sri Lanka, the diaspora can play an important role in pressing for accountability and justice in the international arena. This however involves complex legal and political processes, and also here expert knowledge and lessons learnt from other cases could give valuable input which could make Tamil activists more efficient and self-reflective in their campaigns. The project could make an important contribution by making sure that the pursuit of accountability

and justice for war victims apply not only in relation to the Sri Lankan government, but that there is also a critical discussion of LTTE atrocities and how to deal with that.

As dealing with the past is such a complex and sensitive issue, not only in the currently unfavourable political environment, it would certainly be advisable to join hands with organizations who have a proven track record in getting involved in such processes in other parts of the world and to tab into their expertise.

(c) Development and reconstruction.

There is plenty of experiences and competence within the Tamil diaspora in carrying out development projects in Sri Lanka. However, donors supporting development and reconstruction only to a limited extent make use of this competence, and diaspora Tamils interviewed expressed a wish to work more closely with, and influence, the donors, in order to see to that development and reconstruction projects in Sri Lanka do not exacerbate conflicts and contribute to further marginalisation of Tamils there. In this field, it would be relevant if (*[redacted]* could create meeting spaces between donors and persons in the diaspora with experience of development work. Moreover, the project could identify relevant topics for training of diaspora Tamils engaged in development, e.g. conflict sensitivity and development, and enhance the connections between Tamil diaspora activists active in Sri Lanka and the BHC in Sri Lanka.

We do not suggest that the project in the future carries out work in all these areas, but that it chooses one or two of them. This would ensure a focused approach, where much effort can be put into designing a programme which caters to the needs of Tamil activists, and on bringing in expert knowledge around these specific topics. In order to ensure that the project activities are indeed something that is of interest and relevance for key diaspora persons, there will be a need for interaction in the form of pre-meetings and discussions with different groups within the diaspora. The good contacts and long-standing commitment of the project staff will be useful to pursue this. But again, we would also like to highlight that the project needs to ensure that it can broaden its appeal beyond the already known segments of the diaspora. A continued research component of the project would be of high relevance, as Tamil diaspora politics continue to be dynamic and of great interests to a broader academic and political community. However, the sensitive nature of diaspora politics warrants a strategic choice to be made. The project may choose to focus only on the needs of the diaspora, and hence see to that information (including research) primarily reaches relevant persons and groups in the diaspora – or it

may choose to publish results as widely as possible, as a way to contribute also to the academic accumulation of knowledge on diasporas and peace-building. Both these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, which would have to be discussed.

Appendix 1: Persons interviewed

(*[redacted]*

[1] (*[redacted]*_conducted all the research for the evaluation and wrote the first draft of the report. (*[redacted]*_ acted as a sounding board during that period and he was leading in the revisions of the report. Both authors share full responsibility for the content of the report.
[2] (*[redacted]*_(2010): The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE. Asia report no. 186.
[3] (*[redacted]* (2010). (*[redacted]*
[4] See (*[redacted]* et al (2011):*Arms trade to Sri Lanka – global business, local costs*,http://www.svenskafreds.se/material/arms-trade-with-sri-lanka-global-business-local-costs.

n. Engaging Transnational Communities for Just and Inclusive Development in Sri Lanka Implemented by (*[redacted]* (with financial support from the UK Government through CPP).

The purpose of the project is to empower Sri Lankan Diaspora groups, especially the increasingly more influential segments of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim transnational business community, to constructively engage and address the systemic socio-economic causes of conflict in Sri Lanka.

work over the last several years has focused on local business leaderships, aiming to develop the positive contribution that the private sector can make towards economic, social and political stability in the region. Building on the previous work, the current initiative is a two-year dialogue and networking project aiming to engage the Sri Lankan business Diaspora as an entry point to the wider Diaspora communities, with the objective of:

1. Generating a new discourse in the Sri Lankan Diaspora that goes beyond ethno-political dimensions of conflict in Sri Lanka to incorporate issues of governance, social and economic development, and constitutional and political reform.

2. Encouraging alternative opinions within the Sinhala transnational communities by providing the space for new and informed issue-based debates that will encourage new voices and approaches with in the Sinhala community to enable lasting peace in Sri Lanka.

3. Taking steps towards building a 'Southern' consensus within the Diaspora by facilitating informed Sinhala interactions with Tamil groups on Sinhala / Tamil aspirations in regard to nation-building efforts in Sri Lanka.

4. Reframing issues of regional development and marginalisation in the context of business and investment by enabling the business Diaspora (Sinhala, Tamil as well as Muslim) to discuss and analyse issues of regional economic development, political empowerment, and stability.

5. Developing a policy framework: One that would provide lessons learnt, guidelines and an understanding of how to best approach Diaspora groups in the context of peacebuilding, reconciliation and development.

(*[redacted]* is an independent peacebuilding organisation that has worked for over 20 years to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict. *[redacted]*/multifaceted approach focuses both in and across various regions; aiming to shape policies and practices that affect peacebuilding; and helping build skills and capacity through training.

(*[redacted]* field work is based in Africa, South Asia, the South Caucasus, Latin America, Lebanon and the Philippines. The thematic projects work at local, regional and international levels, focusing on cross-cutting issues critical to building sustainable peace. These include business and economy, gender, governance, aid, security and justice. *[redacted]*

In Sri Lanka, (*[redacted]* has been working on a variety of Peacebuilding initiatives since the 1990s. The organisation's recent work has focused on local business leaders, aiming to develop the positive contribution that the private sector can make towards economic, social and political stability. *[redacted]* Sri Lanka works closely together with a number of business associations such as the *[redacted]*. *[redacted]*]Collaborates also with a number of academic and civil society organisations in Sri Lanka for its research and advocacy work. *[redacted]* activity consists of four components:

1. The mobilisation of local business leaders towards conflict-sensitive business interventions and community reconciliation in the regions;

2. The analysis of local socio-economic conditions and gaps in development policy;

3. The set-up of strategic partnerships between local, national and Diaspora business leaders to lobby for inclusive growth and just social policy reform;

4. The facilitation of policy dialogue on issues of youth exclusion and conflict-sensitive employment programmes. At the same time, *[redacted]* Sri Lanka is beginning to engage with *[redacted]* involvements in other parts of South Asia as the organisation develops a platform aimed to contribute towards peace and stability at regional level.